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For-profit art galleries are making news for the donations they are providing to 
nonprofit art organizations to support exhibitions by artists these galleries represent 
(part of a broader practice I term “crayola,” in reference to payola, the word invented to 
describe a similar practice of paying for airtime on radio and television).  Yet nonprofit 
art organizations are committed to advancing art for the public interest, not for private 
profit.  This Article examines whether there are any meaningful limits on crayola gallery 
donations that support art exhibitions at nonprofit arts organizations, focusing on the 
legal framework governing federal tax-exempt status, as well as the self-regulatory rules 
and informal norms of the art industry.  Does the existing regime allow gallery-supported 
art exhibitions or do these activities contravene nonprofit art organizations’ missions?  
What short-term and long-term solutions are available and appropriate in light of the 
causes and context of gallery-supported art exhibitions?  These questions are animated 
by the broader dialogue about equitable access to publicly funded resources, with the 
answers having important implications for what it means to promote art that is 
representative of American society. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2007, “©MURAKAMI”, a large-scale retrospective exhibition for Japanese 
artist Takashi Murakami, opened at the Museum of Contemporary Art in Los Angeles 
(MOCA).  Murakami’s art is acclaimed for its direct engagement with commerciality, 
and ©MURAKAMI did not disappoint.  In addition to a number of his other artworks and 
exhibition-related merchandise that were for sale, the retrospective debuted “Oval 
Buddha”, a twenty-foot tall, platinum leaf-covered sculpture created after Murakami’s 
own likeness.1  Following the exhibition, Oval Buddha ultimately sold at an art fair—
where a majority of galleries’ art sales takes place today2—for $8 million.3  More notable 
than the price was the way that ©MURAKAMI was funded and produced.  The 
Murakami retrospective at MOCA largely owed its existence to the financial backing of 
private galleries that had represented Murakami for many years.  Blum & Poe, a Los 
Angeles-based gallery that had shown Murakami’s work for decades, not only chartered a 
private jet to fly out Oval Buddha from Tokyo, but also donated $100,000 dollars toward 
the exhibition, bought $50,000 worth of tickets to the opening night gala, and paid for the 
exhibition’s advertising.  Gagosian Gallery, which represents Murakami in New York, 
Emmanuel Perrotin, who represents him in Paris, and a third gallery who formerly 
represented Murakami each matched Blum & Poe’s six-figure donation.4  
The ©MURAKAMI exhibit is one high profile example of a trend in which for-
profit galleries fund exhibitions of the artists they represent at nonprofit art museums, art 
organizations and alternative arts spaces – spaces committed to advancing art for the 
public interest, not for profit.  Gallery-supported exhibitions at museums, in particular, 
occur when a commercial gallery provides money to a nonprofit museum to support an 
exhibition, which may or may not be a pre-planned part of the nonprofit museum’s 
programming.  Bruce Altshuler, director of the museum studies program at New York 
University and former director of the Isamu Noguchi Garden Museum, a nonprofit art 
museum in New York City, compared the practice to “accepting money from a 
corporation to display its merchandise.”5  Galleries’ donations vary in size, with estimates 
ranging from $5,000 to $200,000 per gallery.  Museums claim to tailor contributions to a 
gallery’s capacity to pay.6  Even so, the figure is substantial, given that even expensive 
                                                      
1    DON THOMPSON, THE $12 MILLION STUFFED SHARK: THE CURIOUS ECONOMICS OF 
CONTEMPORARY ART 222 (2010).  ©MURAKAMI included an entire room in the exhibition devoted to 
exhibition-related merchandise, as well as a Louis Vuitton boutique that sold the luxury fashion label’s 
limited edition handbags designed by Murakami, reportedly averaging sales of ten bags per day.  Id. See also 
Carol Vogel, Many Old Names but Few Showstoppers at Art Basel, N. Y. TIMES (June 5, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/05/arts/design/05fair.html [perma.cc/2VSF-FBZ9]. 
2 ISABELLE GRAW, HIGH PRICE: ART BETWEEN THE MARKET AND CELEBRITY CULTURE 68 (2010) 
(“the majority of a gallery’s business has been made at a growing number of art fairs”); but see Robin 
Pogrebin, How a Dealer Prepares for the “Most Important” Art Fair of the Year, N. Y. TIMES (June 8, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/09/arts/design/how-a-dealer-prepares-for-the-most-important-art-fair-of-
the-year.html [perma.cc/T87A-JXKH] (“fairs account for about 40 percent of gallery sales by value, 
according to the TEFAF Art Market Report”).  
3 Vogel, supra note 2. 
4 Jori Finkel, Museums Solicit Dealers’ Largess, N. Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/18/arts/design/18fink.html [perma.cc/6CRW-FZUP].   
5  Id. (commenting on the ©MURAKAMI exhibition specifically and expressing concern about 
MOCA’s fund-raising from galleries as more problematic than its hosting of the Louis Vuitton boutique, 
which seemed to him “perfectly in the spirit of Murakami’s work”). 
6  Pogrebin, supra note 2. 
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exhibitions at nonprofit art museums are likely to incur direct expenses between $13 to 
$200 per square foot, in addition to high indirect costs of conservation, packing, artifact 
loans, shipping and exhibition advertising.7  
For example, using such data from a recent Smithsonian study to estimate the 
cost of the 35,000 square foot ©MURAKAMI exhibition,8 the donations made by the 
galleries representing Murakami alone would have accounted for fifty percent of direct 
exhibition costs – and this estimate excludes indirect costs covered by the gallery such as 
advertising and Oval Buddha’s transpacific private jet transportation.9  Alternatively, if 
the total direct expenses of ©MURAKAMI ran on the high end of industry averages for 
direct exhibition costs, calculations using such industry data suggest that ©MURAKAMI 
could have cost $7 million.  Figures so large in the absolute suggest that even a donation 
comprising a small fraction of the total cost may be determinative in bringing an 
exhibition to the public, given the extreme cost of the entire exhibition.10 Today’s tight 
budgets and limited funding availability mean that such margins may make the difference 
in choosing which exhibitions to present. 
While galleries have always provided scholarly support to museums exhibiting 
their artists’ work, it is becoming common for galleries to pay the nonprofit institutions to 
present shows featuring work by the artists represented by such galleries.11 I term this 
practice “crayola” in reference to payola, the word invented to describe a similar practice 
of paying for airtime on radio and television. For those galleries that can afford it, they 
feel they compelled to pay given the reciprocal benefit.12  For those that cannot, the 
practice raises concerns of a pay-to-play system that distorts art programming at the 
expense of the independence, curatorial integrity and especially the tax-exempt status of 
museums and other nonprofit art institutions.13  Specifically, the practice of galleries 
providing financial backing for nonprofit art exhibitions raises legal questions about 
whether galleries’ financing of exhibitions advances the public purpose of a nonprofit art 
institution.  Artist Bill Powhida prominently critiqued questionable curating practices in 
                                                      
7 Sarah Bartlett & Christopher Lee, Measuring the Rule of Thumb: How Much Do Exhibitions 
Cost?, EXHIBITIONIST (2012), http://name-
aam.org/uploads/downloadables/EXH.fall_12/8.%20EXH%20fall_12_Measuring%20the%20Rule%20of%20
Thumb_Bartlett_Lee.pdf [perma.cc/Z92L-BPYW] (citing indirect costs of art exhibitions); Mark Walhimer, 
How Much Do Museum Exhibitions Cost?, MUSEUM PLANNER (June 23, 2011), 
http://museumplanner.org/how-much-do-exhibits-cost/ [perma.cc/F9Q6-548X] (indicating per square foot 
cost of art museum exhibitions between $75 and $200); Smithsonian Institution Office of Policy and 
Analysis, The Costs of Funding Exhibitions (2002), 
http://www.si.edu/Content/opanda/docs/Rpts2002/02.08.CostsFundingExhibitions.Final.pdf [perma.cc/29PU-
G9EP] (indicating art museums’ median per square foot exhibition costs at $13 to $27 per square foot).  
8  SARAH THORNTON, SEVEN DAYS IN THE ART WORLD 100 (2008) (stating location of 
©MURAKAMI as MOCA’s 35,000 Geffen Contemporary building). 
9 This estimate was calculated by dividing the $300,000 donation from Blum & Poe, Gagosian and 
Perrotin galleries by the total estimated cost of the exhibition ($17 per square foot in direct costs multiplied 
by the 35,000 square foot Geffen exhibition space, for a total cost of $595,000 to $7 million). 
10 See infra note 30. 
11 Id. (citing examples including the partial funding of the Whitney Museum of American Art’s 
2015 Frank Stella retrospective by the Marianne Boesky and Dominique Lévy galleries, which jointly 
represent Mr. Stella; the Museum of Fine Arts, Houston’s Vera Lutter exhibition by the Gagosian Gallery, 
which represents Ms. Lutter;  and the Los Angeles County Museum of Art’s Pierre Huyghe show by the 
Marian Goodman Gallery, which represents Mr. Huyghe). 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
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his work How the New Museum Committed Suicide with Banality (2009).  His cartoon, 
which he bluntly subtitled, “How to Use a Non-Profit Museum to Elevate Your Social 
Status and Raise Market Values,” likened the subject art institution to a showroom.14  
Powhida’s analogy underscores the important legal question as to whether exemption 
from federal income tax is appropriately granted to nonprofit art institutions, whose 
marquee programming seems to be increasingly in furtherance of select commercial, non-
exempt galleries’ interest.  This inquiry echoes similar questions raised with respect to 
the for-profit activities of nonprofit museums and art organizations15 and in other areas of 
the fine arts,16 as well as in other industries.17  However, the practice of galleries funding 
art exhibitions at nonprofit art organizations has not been previously examined in legal 
scholarship. 
This Article examines galleries’ practice of financially supporting art exhibitions 
presented by nonprofit art institutions, in light of the requirement imposed upon 
charitable organizations by the United States Internal Revenue Code to “exclusively” 
conduct activities that advance a public interest. 18   Board members of nonprofit art 
organizations have fiduciary duties that require fidelity to the organizational mission, but 
courts’ deferential position results in tax rules being more restrictive in practice. 19  
                                                      
14 William Powhida, How the New Museum Committed Suicide with Banality, BROOKLYN RAIL 
(Nov. 2009), http://www.brooklynrail.org/2009/11/ [perma.cc/ER7A-S6L7]. 
15 See, e.g., Leila John, Museums and the Tax Collector: The Tax Treatment of Museums at the 
Federal, State, and Local level, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 877 (2013); Elizabeth Bildner, Conflicting Ethics: A 
Case Study of New Museum’s Exhibit “Skin Fruit: Selections from the Dakis Joannou Collection,” 21 
NYSBA ENTERTAINMENT, ARTS & SPORTS L. J. 100 (2010); Andras Kosaras, Note: Federal Income and State 
Property Tax Exemption of Commercialized Nonprofits: Should Profit-Seeking Art Museums Be Tax 
Exempt?, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 115 (Fall 2000); Carolyn C. Clark and John Sare, Income-producing 
Activities of US Museums: Where does Charity stop and Commerce begin?, 21 INT’L LEGAL PRAC. 82 (1996); 
Peter A. Levitan, Serving God and Mammon: Financing Alternatives for Nonprofit Cultural Enterprises, 8 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 403 (1983-1984). 
16 See, e.g., Miranda Perry Fleischer, How is the Opera Like a Soup Kitchen?, in THE 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TAX LAW (Monica Bhandari ed., 2016); Leia LeFay, One Singular 
Sensation: The Rise of Enhancement Deals Between Nonprofit Theatres and Commercial Producers, 21 
NYSBA ENTERTAINMENT, ARTS AND SPORTS L. J. 88 (2010); Carolyn Casselman, Waltzing with the Muse or 
Dancing with the Devil: Enhancement Deals Between Nonprofit Theaters and Commercial Producers, 27 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 323 (2004). 
17 See, e.g., Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer and Joseph R. Ganahl, Taxing Social Enterprise, 66 STAN. L. 
REV. 387 (2014); Peter Molk, Reforming Nonprofit Exemption Requirements, 27 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 
475 (2012); Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, The “Independent” Sector: Fee-for-Service Charity and the Limits of 
Autonomy, 65 VAND. L. REV. 51 (2012); John D. Colombo, Article: The NCAA, Tax Exemption, and College 
Athletics, 2010 U ILL. L. REV. 109 (2010). 
18 See Part III.A, infra. 
19 State agency and nonprofit corporation laws impose certain duties, fiduciary and otherwise, upon 
both galleries and art museums that may affect museums’ ability to accept funding to present an exhibition.  
To the extent that an artist entrusts work to the gallery through a consignment or more comprehensive artist-
dealer agreement, the gallery becomes an agent of the artist.  Whether an art organization is organized as a 
nonprofit corporation or a trust, the directors and employees of such art organizations are also fiduciaries to 
their organization, and can be sued for their role in activities that deviate from the art organization’s mission.   
See generally Sue Chen, Art Deaccessions and the Limits of Fiduciary Duty, 14 ART ANTIQUITY AND LAW 
103 (analyzing fiduciary duties of art museum board member duties with respect to artwork deaccessioning 
activities at museums).  Museums and other nonprofit art organizations, as charitable organizations, have 
obligations to the public as their beneficiaries, and the state has the power to enforce such obligations. 
Leonard DuBoff, Christy O. King & Sally Holt Caplan, The Museum Organization, 2 in THE DESKBOOK OF 
ART LAW, T-21 (1997).  In each case, state agency law governs the fiduciary relationship between the 
fiduciary and principal.  Agency law in general requires the fiduciary to act only in the interest of the 
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Nonprofit art organizations receive federal income tax exemption conditional upon their 
pursuit of a charitable purpose that serves a public, rather than a private, interest.20 
Organizations do not have a charitable, exemption-eligible purpose if they conduct their 
activities in a commercial manner.21  In addition, 501(c)(3) organizations operate  subject 
to the condition that their assets do not benefit of any individual who exercises control 
over them. 22   A further restriction on 501(c)(3) organizations, the “private benefit 
doctrine,” prohibits third parties to the organization from benefiting from a relationship 
with the nonprofit more than incidentally.23  It is the broader public, rather than any 
individual insider(s) or external private entity(s), who should benefit from the 
organization’s mission and activities in furtherance thereof.24  These rules have fairly 
strictly prohibited nonprofit art galleries from selling art.  It is unclear whether the same 
rules can and do extend to the practice of gallery-supported art exhibitions, which seem 
to effectively enable for-profit galleries to conduct—for the price of a “donation” fee—
some of their commercial activities in connection with nonprofit art exhibitions. 
This Article concludes that the relevant legal and nonlegal framework suggests 
limits upon nonprofit art institutions display of gallery-supported exhibitions in at least 
some circumstances.  Yet, it also acknowledges the complex nature of art and its 
relationship to the commercial sphere, as well as the structural, budget-constrained 
conditions that compel nonprofit art institutions to seek such assistance in the first place.  
Therefore, this Article’s broader argument is for policy that is more sensitive to the 
complicated context of the art market, as well as supportive of all artists and the art they 
create.  Ultimately, this Article seeks to raise awareness of the legal issues and 
implications presented by gallery-supported museum exhibitions among gallerists, 
curators, board members of nonprofit art museums, and the taxpaying public. Only with 
such awareness can such actors effectively dialogue about the appropriate limits on 
nonprofit art museums’ relationship with galleries and place in our public cultural life 
more broadly.  This Article’s principal contribution is to the tax law literature addressing 
                                                                                                                                                   
principal and forgo all personal advantage aside from reasonable compensation.  For a commercial gallery 
that represents an artist, this means maximizing sales.  Meanwhile, in order for any exhibition to be presented 
in accordance with the museum’s duties, it must further the charitable mission of the museum.  Curatorial 
integrity is central to achieving the museum’s mission, so museums must avoid any financial or other 
influences that compromise it or give the appearance of doing so.  Therefore, in considering whether to 
accept sponsorship of art exhibitions, a museum or other nonprofit art institution “should consider the 
public’s view of such sponsorship and question whether it compromises the purpose and goals of the cultural 
institution or the particular exhibit receiving the support.”  Id. at T-40.  In evaluating fiduciary duty 
compliance, courts are generally hesitant to replace directors’ judgment with their own.  Chen, supra note 19, 
at 119.  Fuller discussion of fiduciary duties’ finer contours and their applicability to gallery-supported art 
exhibitions is outside the scope of this Article. 
20  A charitable purpose is any which fits within the broad language of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), namely 
the promotion of "religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, 
or to foster national or international amateur sports competition…, or for the prevention of cruelty to children 
or animals…” I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
21  See Part IV.B.4, infra. 
22  Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838 (1980). 
23  Redlands Surgical Servs. v. Comm’r, 113 T.C. 47, 74 (1999).  Occasional economic benefits 
flowing to persons as an incidental consequence of an organization pursuing exempt charitable purposes will 
not generally constitute prohibited private benefits. Am. Campaign Acad. v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1053, 1065–66 
(1989). 
24  Treas. Reg. 1.501(c)(3) –1(d)ii (1982) (“An organization is not organized or operated 
exclusively for one or more of the purposes specified in [subdivision (d)(i)] unless it serves a public rather 
than a private interest.”).  
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exempt organizations’ primary purpose requirement and the appropriate treatment of 
transactions between for-profit and nonprofit institutions in the art world.  Beyond its 
primary focus, this Article also has broader implications for theory and policy in other 
areas of law, including sponsorship law, nonprofit governance, and the public/private 
distinction. 
Though gallery-supported art exhibitions take place at nonprofit art institutions 
across the spectrum, including art museums and alternative arts spaces such as Redcat in 
Los Angeles,25 this Article will focus primarily upon museums as one example in a wider 
trend of nonprofit art organizations that accept galleries’ financial support in presenting 
art exhibitions.  Specifically, this Article examines whether gallery-supported art 
exhibitions comply with nonprofit art institutions’ requirement to exclusively conduct 
exempt activities and whether such institutions comply with industry regulations and 
norms.  Part II discusses the art market and its actors, with an emphasis on art museums, 
galleries and other relevant art exhibition spaces, and each of their respective roles in 
exhibiting art.  This section also offers a more detailed description of gallery-supported 
art exhibitions.  Part III presents the federal tax law governing cooperation between 
nonprofit and for-profit entities, focusing on determination of exempt purpose, excess 
benefit and taxation on non-exempt activities conducted by nonprofit organizations.  This 
section also examines select applicable self-regulatory industry association guidance, and 
industry norms applicable to gallery-supported art exhibitions.  Part IV analyzes gallery-
supported art exhibitions under this guidance, finding that they may even endanger 
nonprofit art museums’ exempt status entirely.   
II. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
In order to accurately analyze gallery-supported museum exhibitions, it is 
necessary first to precisely contextualize art museums, galleries and the art market.  Of 
course, the nature of the art market and its actors is a source of timeless debate.  
Therefore, this section does not seek to settle such questions, but rather provides a rough 
overview based on industry, media, academic and legal sources. 
A. Commercial and Noncommercial Art Exhibitions 
In the United States, nonprofit art organizations and for-profit galleries have 
traditionally occupied distinct roles in the production of art, even while both entities 
engage in the exhibition of art.  A for-profit art gallery, such as a commercial, 
cooperative or vanity gallery, exhibits and offers art for sale on behalf of artists, with 
whom the gallery has a formal relationship as the artists’ agent or dealer.  Meanwhile, 
nonprofit art museums engage and educate the public about art outside of the market.  
Historically, the primary purpose of for-profit galleries has been to sell or re-sell art on 
the primary market, while the art market’s noncommercial actors—not only museums, 
but also alternative spaces and nonprofit galleries—exist both as a part of the discourse 
setting infrastructure of the art industry and as contextualizing institutions that provide 
the public with an opportunity to see artworks in context.  Accordingly, when for-profit 
art galleries sell works, the gallery owner and artist take home the income. The income, if 
any, derived from works produced in the noncommercial context primarily benefits the 
wider public and is reinvested in future programming or operational costs.  Thus, 
galleries represent the commercial, private interest in the art market; art museums 
                                                      
25 Finkel, supra note 4. 
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represent the noncommercial, public interest; and alternative spaces and nonprofit 
galleries both exist somewhere at the intersection of for-profit galleries and art museums.   
These commercial and noncommercial entities comprise part of the growing 
multi-dimensional art market composed of different sectors that function together to 
produce and legitimize art.  These sectors include (1) the commercial art market, which is 
split into a primary market of artists, galleries, and collectors, and a secondary market of 
dealers and auction houses; (2) the knowledge market, including conferences, art 
academies, and publications; (3) the market of institutions, dominated by museums and 
art societies; and (4) the market of major exhibitions such as the Bienniales, Manifestas, 
and Documentas. 26   These individual markets exist side by side and also overlap.27  
Within this web, the role of art museum exhibitions, and art museums generally, 
functions as one institution that contributes to the generation of art’s symbolic value28 
that in turn drives art’s commercial value.29  
Commercial exhibitions of art in a for-profit gallery are created by the artist for 
the primary market and produced by a gallerist that coordinates and markets all aspects of 
the exhibition.  A single individual or corporate patron may commission art works and 
cover costs, or the production cost may be funded by the artist and recouped upon sale.  
A commercial gallery may also advance or subsidize an artwork’s production costs 
especially in the case of capital-intensive projects.30  The costs of unprofitable artworks 
are borne by the artist, and in some cases a gallery, to the extent it advances funds to the 
artist.  If an artwork sells, artists usually see half of the profit from sales of their work, 
with galleries retaining a 50% commission to compensate for efforts in marketing and 
placing the art with buyers on the primary market.  Furthermore, if a repurchase and/or 
resale right is negotiated, the gallerist and artist may receive additional income on 
subsequent sales of the same artwork.  Otherwise, neither the gallerist nor artist receives 
further income from future sales made by art dealers or auction houses on the secondary 
market.  Another feature of commercial exhibitions is that traditionally they have not 
been presented in an art historical or otherwise critical manner, beyond any artist 
statement or marketing materials the gallery may provide in connection with the 
exhibition. 
Exhibitions of art in noncommercial settings date back to the establishment of the 
first art museums in the United States in the late nineteenth century.  A desire to provide 
classical education of the American public, as well as an intent to shape a popular culture 
                                                      
26 According to Sarah Thornton, “a biennial is not just a show that takes place every two years; it is 
a goliath exhibition that is meant to capture the global artistic moment . . . A true biennial is international in 
outlook and hosted by a city rather than a museum . . . Unlike an art fair, where the displays are organized by 
participating galleries, the underlying structures of biennials are determined by national identity and other 
curatorial themes.” THORNTON, supra note 8, at 100.  The Venice Biennial is among the largest and most 
noteworthy.  Id.  Others include Manifesta, a biennial hosted by a different European city every other year, 
and Documenta, hosted in Kassel, Germany every five years.  About the Biennial, MANIFESTA, 
[http://manifesta.org/biennials/about-the-biennials [perma.cc/9PJA-Z958]; THORNTON, supra note 8, at 100.  
27  GRAW, supra note 2, at 65. 
28  See Part III.D, infra, for a more detailed discussion on the meaning of symbolic value of art. 
29  GRAW, supra note 2, at 21. See generally OLAV VELTHUIS, TALKING PRICES: SYMBOLIC 
MEANINGS OF PRICES ON THE MARKET FOR CONTEMPORARY ART (2007).  
30   W.A.G.E. (Working Artists and the Greater Economy), Certification Background, “Production 
Costs,” http://www.wageforwork.com/certification/5/certification-background [perma.cc/UDM8-LBDQ] 
(last visited Nov. 10, 2017). 
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in which art was prominent, drove wealthy businessmen, industrialists and heirs to 
establish art museums. Traditionally, noncommercial exhibitions presented art belonging 
to a museum’s collection that, except in rare cases, was not commissioned or otherwise 
directly acquired from an artist.  Rather, art museums’ collections comprised of art either 
purchased on the secondary market from a dealer or through an auction house, or donated 
by a collector.  Today, more than ninety percent of the art collections held in public trust 
by America’s art museums have been donated by private individuals.31 
 
B. Strategies for Financing Art Exhibitions at Museums 
A museum’s costs entail a budget for purchasing, preserving and interpreting art, 
in addition to operational costs associated with overhead and the administration of the 
museum by its curator and staff.  To cover such costs, neither direct government 
funding 32  nor the sale of works from art museums’ collections (also known as 
deaccessioning)33 are available as primary sources of support. Rather, art museums have 
historically depended upon direct funding from the private sector to cover costs,34 in 
seeming contradiction to art museums’ noncommercial purpose and anti-market stance.  
A decrease in direct private funding, combined with growing operating and programmatic 
                                                      
31   ASSOCIATION OF ART MUSEUM DIRECTORS, ASSOCIATION OF ART MUSEUM DIRECTORS 
STANDARDS & PRACTICES: ART MUSEUMS, PRIVATE COLLECTORS AND PUBLIC BENEFIT (2007), 
http://aamd.org/sites/default/files/document/PrivateCollectors3.pdf [perma.cc/Y672-7LNE]. 
32  Ford W. Bell, You Asked: How Are Museums Supported Financially in the United States?, U. S. 
DEPT. OF STATE BUREAU OF INT’L INFO. PROGRAMS (Mar. 14, 2012), 
http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/pamphlet/2012/05/201205155699.html#axzz4EsSZbYBt 
[perma.cc/P7WU-KTJE] (stating that direct government support comprises only 24 percent of art museum 
funding).  Although the government provides relatively little in the way of direct federal, state and local 
funding support of the arts, it otherwise acts as a “facilitator” to create the conditions that allow cultural 
production to happen through a highly decentralized arts infrastructure.  See generally Harry Hillman 
Chartrand & Claire McCaughey, The Arm’s Length Principle and the Arts: An International Perspective - 
Past, Present and Future, in WHO’S TO PAY? FOR THE ARTS: THE INTERNATIONAL SEARCH FOR MODELS OF 
SUPPORT (M.C. Cummings Jr. & J. Mark Davidson Schuster eds., 1989), 
http://www.compilerpress.ca/Cultural%20Economics/Works/Arm%201%201989.htm [perma.cc/7T6F-
5DRV].  Cultural organizations and cultural production are therefore subsidized by taxes, since contributions 
to cultural organizations are made tax-deductible for the philanthropists and corporations who support them; 
in this way, the government encourages cultural patronage by its citizens and private organizations.  Id. 
33  Originally bequests circumscribed museums’ ability to sell, or deaccession, art in order to make 
sure that museum directors did not engage in self-dealing in their own interest at the expense of the art and its 
purpose. Peter Temin, An Economic History of Museums, in THE ECONOMICS OF ART MUSEUMS 179–94, 182 
(Martin Feldstein ed., 1991).  These restrictions were increased and institutionalized in the 1970s after the 
Metropolitan Museum of Art received major scrutiny for selling art to fund the acquisition of other art.  Id. at 
183–84. 
34  The civic groups active in creating the early museums included figures from the arts as well as 
from business. Jennifer A. Donnelly, The CEO Art Museum Director: Business as Usual?,  TRANSATLANTICA 
REV. DÉTUDES AMÉRICAINES AM. STUD. J. (2010), http://transatlantica.revues.org/5044 [perma.cc/FG6B-
PD9D].  See generally Temin, supra note 33, at 181–83.  This is because American society lacked an 
aristocratic class to seed art museums (as was the case in European counterparts), and government provided 
only token, in-kind support for the arts.  Id. at 181.  Private support remained critical in the period following 
the first museums’ establishment, as the institutions expanded and more were built.  Id. at 182.  The federal 
government became a significant patron of the arts as a result of the Depression and the New Deal and has 
remained a source of funding with the 1965 establishment of the National Endowment for the Arts.  
Donnelly, supra note 34.  Nonetheless, the private sector has historically been the largest source of the 
noncommercial art museum’s support, and remains so today.  Bell, supra note 32. 
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costs, 35 has driven a shift away from traditional, collection-focused noncommercial art 
exhibitions.  The stated mission of today’s art museums remains educational; due to 
museums’ perpetual search for more and more private support, however, their activities 
and programming have significantly expanded in scope.   
Among the most prominent techniques to raise funds and broaden audiences 
attending art museums is the temporary “blockbuster” exhibition. 36   Although some 
museums were organizing temporary exhibitions in the 1940s, “blockbuster” temporary 
traveling exhibitions were new in their large scale and scope of funding.  The blockbuster 
strategy boosted attendance at the same time that it raised the standard for exhibitions to 
attract wide audiences and revenue.  This expectation persists today, despite the budget 
cuts driven by the faltering global economy in the early twenty-first century, as well as 
criticisms that “blockbusters” detract resources and distract attention from museums’ 
missions.37   
Beyond the “blockbuster” exhibition, museums are continually looking for new 
ways to fund the programming that drives their donations.  Other techniques to attract 
donations included shifting the focus of art museums’ fundraising campaigns to financing 
the construction of new buildings; buildings were then built cheaply enough to support 
operational expenses with the remaining funds after construction completed.38  Museum 
membership drives became another successful strategy, as well as unrestricted gifts.39  
Art museums now seek donors not only among wealthy individuals, but among 
corporations as well, despite the numerous concerns such commercial support raises.40  In 
the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, however, already waning corporate funding for the 
arts has decreased even more.41  It is in this climate that art museums have again gone 
looking for the next untapped well of private sector support, and gallery-supported 
museum exhibitions seem to represent the latest result of that search. While the first 
gallery-supported museum exhibitions predated the financial crisis,42 they became more 
prevalent thereafter43 — and therefore more problematic. 
 
 
                                                      
35  Donations dropped after the 1986 tax code reforms increased marginal tax rates and the 
regulation of art museums’ operations and management – leaving museums with a deficit created by fewer 
donations and more administrative burdens that cost money.  Temin, supra note 33, at 185.  In addition, 
growing inflation in the 1970s took its toll on museums.  Donnelly, supra note 34. 
36  Donnelly, supra note 34.  The first such show in the United States is usually said to be 
“Treasures of Tutankhamen,” shown at six museums (including the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New 
York City) between 1976 and 1978 following its spectacular success at the British Museum in 1972.  Id. 
37  Specifically, “blockbusters” have been criticized for siphoning resources and attention from 
permanent collections and from worthy but possibly less sensational subjects; distracting from the museum’s 
core missions of acquisition, preservation, and interpretation; and placing the focus on attendance numbers, 
attention in the press, and growth for the museum.  Id. 
38  Temin, supra note 33, at 186. 
39  Id. 
40  Donnelly, supra note 34.  
41  Robin Pogrebin, Corporate Support for the Arts, N. Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/21/arts/21fund.html [perma.cc/WC7D-2HPP] (describing pre-financial 
crisis dip in corporate support for arts).  
42 See infra, Part C.  
43 Powhida, supra note 14 (drawing attention to and criticizing gallery-supported art exhibitions as 
they became more common). 
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C. Genesis of Gallery-Sponsored Art Exhibitions 
One of the first exhibitions to draw the nation’s attention to this practice was 
“Sensation” at New York City’s Brooklyn Museum of Art in 1999. 44   Wealthy art 
dealers, galleries and collectors who had financial interests in the artworks shown in 
Sensation funded the estimated $2 million exhibition in significant part: among other 
examples, the museum’s director and his assistants solicited donations of at least $10,000 
from dealers who represented many of the artists whose works were on display, and even 
asked one well known collector, Charles Saatchi, to underwrite the entire show.45  Then-
Mayor Rudolph Giuliani ordered city lawyers to “follow the money trail,” but the 
litigation ultimately settled out of court. 46   Since Sensation, the trend of galleries 
providing financial backing for nonprofit art exhibitions has only increased in prevalence 
and magnitude.   
The practice most recently garnered press again in early 2016, after the New 
York Times reported the role of galleries in funding the new Whitney Museum of 
American Art’s opening exhibition, as well as a number of other recent exhibitions at 
major art museums around the United States.47  Despite the recurring headlines spreading 
awareness about galleries’ role in supporting art over the past fifteen years, however, no 
change has resulted to date.  Such inaction stands in curious contrast to the art industry’s 
self-regulating response to corporate sponsorships of art museum exhibitions, which 
many museums addressed when they adopted revised codes of ethics addressing 
corporate sponsorship.  In spite of this, crayola donations that fund gallery-supported art 
exhibitions have persisted unfettered. 
How a gallery-sponsored art exhibition comes to fruition at a museum varies.  
Some curators visit galleries to gather ideas for potential exhibitions. 48   Among the 
nonprofit art museums that have presented gallery-sponsored exhibitions (because some 
categorically do not),49 some curators say that they exclusively approach galleries for 
                                                      
44    David Barstow, Brooklyn Museum Recruited Donors Who Stood To Gain, N. Y. TIMES (Oct. 
31, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/10/31/nyregion/brooklyn-museum-recruited-donors-who-stood-to-
gain.html [perma.cc/8HBL-694D].  Better known for featuring provocative artworks like The Holy Virgin 
Mary (1996), a canvas depicting the religious icon of the same name adorned with elephant dung, the 
Sensation exhibition led then-Mayor Rudolph Guliani to cut the Brooklyn Museum of Art’s funding and fire 
its board, actions ultimately reversed as unconstitutional curtailment of free speech.  Challenging that 
censorship motivated his actions, however, Giuliani said: “This is all about dollar signs . . . It’s actually a 
desecration of the First Amendment, as much as it is a desecration of religion, to use the First Amendment as 
a shield in order to take money out of the taxpayers’ pockets in order to put that money into the pockets of 
multimillionaires.” 
45 Id. 
46 Alan Feuer, Giuliani Dropping His Bitter Battle with Art Museum, N. Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2000), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/03/28/nyregion/giuliani-dropping-his-bitter-battle-with-art-museum.html 
[perma.cc/LF4K-RWNL]. 
47 Robin Pogrebin, Art Galleries Face Pressure to Fund Museum Shows, N. Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/07/arts/design/art-galleries-face-pressure-to-fund-museum-
shows.html [perma.cc/DG8U-6CKL]. 
48 Lawrence Alloway, When Artists Start Their Own Galleries, N. Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 1983), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1983/04/03/arts/when-artists-start-their-own-galleries.html [perma.cc/C4VF-
NKWF] ("Museum curators accept the idea that it is the function of the galleries to filter the masses of new 
artists, and indeed welcome the tidying hand.”).  See generally RENAUD PROCH & MARI SPIRITO, MAVERICKS: 
THE SHAPE OF THINGS TO COME (2015).  See also Interview with Anonymous Guggenheim Museum of Art 
Representative (Oct. 26, 2013). 
49 Pogrebin, supra note 47. 
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help realizing an exhibition and reject the suggestion that they respond to offers by 
galleries.  Some galleries report that museums have approached them to express interest 
in exhibiting the work of an artist represented by a gallery, conditional upon financial 
support from the gallery for the exhibition.  If a gallery does not have the means to 
provide monetary support, museums may tailor the contribution to the budget of the 
gallery.  Other museums have offered to match a gallery with a wealthy donor interested 
in the work of an artist represented by the gallery, who will loan money to the gallery to 
fund the museum show, in exchange for a work by the artist.  In such arrangements, the 
sum loaned by the donor may be below the going market price of the artist’s work.   
In addition to outright financial support, museums may also ask artists to make 
an in-kind donation of their artwork that it will sell or auction at a fundraising reception 
associated with the exhibition or otherwise.  Other nonmonetary support may include 
framing of artwork, organizing of the opening reception, coordination of loans from 
collectors, and production of exhibition catalogs.  Galleries may directly pay for indirect 
costs associated with an artist’s creating new work for a show, such as advertising, 
shipping costs for any loaned artworks appearing in the show, art installation and even 
fabrication costs of the art itself.  One gallery indicated that “the only thing [it has] not 
been asked for is postage.”50 
Some museums may commission artworks appearing in the exhibition; to the 
extent the new piece is not destined for the museum’s permanent collection, some 
museums will enter into agreements with dealers for the artwork’s ultimate sale, and 
some may not as a matter of museum policy.51  Artists may also create art specifically for 
the exhibition even if it is not commissioned by the museum, and the exhibition may 
feature previously produced art that is or will soon be for sale on either the primary or the 
secondary market.  Beyond rights regarding the individual artworks, other rights over the 
exhibition – namely control over its content and execution, and rights in the exhibition 
catalogue, images and merchandise, sponsorship credit and reciprocal sponsorship – vary 
as well.  The gallery support arrangements addressing these issues may be structured as a 
straightforward sponsorship or similar to a traditional licensing agreement.  In some 
cases, the nonprofit museum controls all rights in the exhibition, including its content, 
and is responsible for its genesis and production. The gallery is but a silent, albeit 
credited, sponsor in the exhibition’s opening as well as in any other exhibitions at 
museums to which it travels, often for a fee.  In other cases, the artist and gallery retain 
greater rights and exert more control.  For example, the activities of the entire 
©MURAKAMI exhibit were controlled by the artist himself, pursuant to four contracts: 
(1) a co-publishing agreement for the exhibition catalogue, (2) an image licensing 
agreement for the publicity, (3) a data treatment memorandum related to the use of super-
high resolution files to make things like merchandise, and (4) a seven-page letter of 
agreement outlining, among other details, Murakami’s “final right of approval on all 
aspects of everything.”52   
D. Impacts of Gallery-Sponsored Art Exhibitions 
In practice, some recent gallery-museum collaborations resemble actual joint 
ventures carried out to generate revenue, permitting the gallery and museum to each have 
                                                      
50 Id. 
51  Finkel, supra note 4. 
52  Id.; THORNTON, supra note 8, at 181–218. 
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some control in the project. 53   Although the revenue generated from the exhibition 
ultimately may not appear to offset the costs of the exhibition, the audiences attracted by 
the exhibition are critical to the success of future grant awards and donations.  In 
addition, the exhibition may travel, generating a continuing income stream from fees paid 
by host museums.  Meanwhile, benefits for the gallery include, in the words of Jeffrey 
Deitch, longtime dealer and former director of the Museum of Contemporary Art, Los 
Angeles, “the best platform in the art world for free, where they can sell work to their 
clients on the walls of the greatest museums.”54  Another dealer, James Cohan, echoes 
this sentiment: “The competition to get one’s artist seen in a noncommercial context like 
a museum or international survey is quite intense but ultimately hugely gratifying.  It’s 
part of our job to step up to support our artists.”55  A gallery’s other artists may indirectly 
benefit as well from the raised profile and increased legitimacy brought by a prominent 
exhibition sponsorship.   
To be sure, galleries’ financial support helps bring big budget art exhibitions to 
the public that might not otherwise occur in an era of falling arts funding.  However, in 
the art industry, bigger is not necessarily better, and the market’s limited ability to 
determine art’s significance compounds the worry that such nonprofit art institutions – 
and the public they serve – are missing out on the work of talented and culturally 
important artists who are not represented by galleries with the means to sponsor art 
exhibitions.56 In addition, galleries’ role in sponsoring art exhibitions has significant non-
legal implications that may threaten the integrity of art institutions, as value-legitimators 
central to an already opaque art-financial industry,57 and as cultural establishments that 
are inclusive and representative of society at large.   
There remains a scarcity of artists who are not of culturally dominant 
demographic groups (including nonmale, nonwhite, nonheterosexual, noncisgender 
and/or non-Eurocentric artists) from the rosters of galleries that have resources to finance 
museum exhibitions.  Galleries financed approximately one third of the major solo 
exhibitions at American art museums between 2007 and 2013.58  Of the 121 artists 
currently represented by such galleries, nineteen (15.7%) are women and ten (8.3%) are 
nonwhite artists.59  Gender disparity is especially pronounced; only around thirty percent 
                                                      
53  Joint Venture, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th. ed. 2014) (defining a joint venture as “[a] 
business undertaking by two or more persons engaged in a single defined project. The necessary elements are 
(1) an express or implied agreement; (2) a common purpose that the group intends to carry out; (3) shared 
profits and losses; and (4) each member’s equal voice in controlling the project.”). 
54  Pogrebin, supra note 2. 
55  Id. 
56   For example, one potential consequence of art exhibitions relying upon galleries for financial 
support is that there may be fewer exhibitions of noncommercial art that are difficult to own or sell in any 
conventional way, such as performance art and social practice art.  
57   Stuart Plattner, A Most Ingenious Paradox: The Market for Contemporary Fine Art, 100 AM. 
ANTHRO. 482, 8, http://www.stuartplattner.com/aa-art-paradox.pdf [perma.cc/FF3P-CKLX] (examining the 
lack of clear guidance supporting the valuation of art). 
58 Julia Halperin, Almost one third of solo shows in US museums go to artists represented by just 
five galleries, THE ART NEWSPAPER (Apr. 2, 2015), http://old.theartnewspaper.com/articles/Almost-one-third-
of-solo-shows-in-US-museums-go-to-artists-represented-by-just-five-galleries/37402 [perma.cc/Q3EU-
TKZ3]. 
59 See generally GAGOSIAN GALLERY, Artists, http://www.gagosian.com/artists [perma.cc/9HHE-
Q7RS]; PACE GALLERY, Artists, http://www.pacegallery.com/ [perma.cc/CHX8-98QV]; MARIAN GOODMAN 
GALLERY, Artists, http://www.mariangoodman.com/artists [perma.cc/FN3G-NESM]; HAUSER & WIRTH, 
Artists, http://www.hauserwirth.com/artists/ [perma.cc/T36S-8BHE]. 
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of the artists represented by commercial galleries in the United States are women.60  This 
is in stark contrast to recent figures that show women represent more than sixty percent 
of the students in art programs in the United States.61  This discrepancy may thus affect 
the representativeness of the supposedly critically acclaimed art presented by art 
museums, providing yet another reason to be troubled by galleries’ financing of museums 
exhibitions.  Indeed, the percentage of solo exhibitions by female artists at five major 
contemporary art museums in the United States – the Museum of Modern Art, the 
Whitney Museum of American Art, the Guggenheim Museum, the Museum of 
Contemporary Art Los Angeles and the Los Angeles County Museum of Art – hovers 
around only twenty percent.62 Black artists have recently seen greater success in major art 
museums but “[i]t’s not happening everywhere, and there’s still a long way to go.”63 
As more galleries and art museums cooperate to bring in audiences at gallery-
supported museum exhibitions, there are increasingly fewer truly independently produced 
exhibitions of art in the United States today.  The art exhibited at museums is determined 
by popular pressures, market demand and the galleries that can pay for them.  In turn, 
galleries, increasingly corporate 64  and characterized by temporary, transactional 
partnerships with artists, have lost their loyalty to artists and the fixed-profile, 
programmatic vision of art that they formerly championed.65  Instead, galleries are driven 
by the art market – and in the huge contemporary art market, with total global sales of 
$63.8 billion in 2015 of which the United States has a market share of 43%, 66 the effect 
of such demand is enormous.  Since the 1990s at the latest, collectors and their buying 
habits, alongside gallerists, influence the process of art’s value creation much more than 
critics do.67  
E. Alternatives to Gallery-Sponsored Art Exhibitions 
The collaboration between commercial galleries and art museums in producing 
gallery-supported museum exhibitions is especially troubling in light of the decline of 
other producers of “noncommercial” art exhibitions.  In theory, nonprofit galleries and 
alternative art spaces crowd the contemporary noncommercial art exhibition scene and 
                                                      





63 Randy Kennedy, Black Artists and the March Into the Museum, N. Y. Times (Nov. 28, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/29/arts/design/black-artists-and-the-march-into-the-museum.html 
[perma.cc/C3WH-QU6P]. 
64  GRAW, supra note 2, at 18; Legacy Russell, Beauty & The Beast: Collectivity and the 
Corporation, GUERNICA (2012), http://www.guernicamag.com/daily/legacy-russell-beauty-the-beast-
collectivity-and-the-corporation/ [perma.cc/PAT8-Q8XZ] (last visited Jul 20, 2016).  
65  See GRAW, supra note 2, at 118; Robin Pogrebin, It’s an Art Gallery. No, a Living Room. O.K., 
Both., N. Y. TIMES (July 3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/04/arts/design/its-an-art-gallery-no-a-
living-room-ok-both.html [perma.cc/TXP4-LKM6] (describing the art world as one “in which dealer 
representation is increasingly hard to come by”).  
66  TEFAF 2016 Art Market Report, ARTNET NEWS (2016), http://news.artnet.com/market/tefaf-
2016-art-market-report-443615 [perma.cc/585V-VDRU]. 
67  GRAW, supra note 2, at 121; Id. at 59 (stating that artists, galleries and art collectors are business 
partners who live in a single economic sphere); Id. at 99 (discussing the “now-pervasive figure of the 
‘collector-dealer’ who tends to claim the additional functions of a curator or publicist. He collects and deals 
in art, speculating on the appreciation of his purchases, which he buys at attractive prices, possibly splitting 
resale profits with the gallerist.”).  
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complicate art museums’ role in the art market.  Nonprofit galleries operate as the 
commercial-lite, lower commission, educational version of a for-profit gallery, assuming 
the nonprofit gallery even sells the work at all.  Alternative arts spaces are anti-
commercial, independent venues that put on shows and workshops which defy traditional 
standards of art display and categorization.  Emerging and experimental artists may 
exhibit, show or workshop their art at nonprofit galleries or alternative art spaces.  Their 
art may be unsaleable or not commercially viable for any reason, and therefore unsuitable 
to a for-profit gallery; it may also be outside the scope of a museum’s mission, or not yet 
recognized as a work of stature warranting inclusion in a museum’s collection.68 Like art 
museums, noncommercial nonprofit galleries and anti-commercial alternative arts spaces 
lack a financial mandate to maximize profits.  Furthermore, both nonprofit arts galleries 
and alternative arts spaces may be tax-exempt organizations like art museums, and can 
seek tax-deductible donations from individuals, foundations and corporations, as well as 
government funding from municipal, regional, state and national programs.  Art museums 
of an earlier era nonetheless would have been clearly distinct from the other 
noncommercial actors based on their purpose and elitism alone.  Today, however, the 
boundary may be blurred, especially among contemporary art museums that deepen their 
community engagement and broaden their range to include experimental and ephemeral 
art.   
Whatever the similarities among the noncommercial actors in today’s art market, 
market presence remains a significant difference between art museums on the one hand 
and the remaining nonprofit galleries and alternative art spaces on the other.  More 
importantly, while nonprofit galleries and alternative art spaces still operate, they do so in 
significantly smaller numbers69 than during their height in the 1970s.  The reduction of 
public funding for artists and for the arts generally, restructuring of federal supports upon 
which some artists relied,70 and even proscription of alternative art and the galleries that 
featured them71 contributed to the decline of alternative spaces and nonprofit galleries by 
the 1990s.  Therefore, nonprofit art museums and commercial art galleries remain the 
primary actors in the art market presenting art exhibitions today, at the same time that an 
increasing number of gallery-supported museum exhibitions and museum quality gallery 
shows drive their programmatic profiles to converge. 
Despite the decline of nonprofit galleries and alternative arts spaces, nonprofit 
public arts museums have not cornered the market for noncommercial art exhibition.  
Galleries are also beginning to stage exhibitions on par with both public and private 
museums.  For example, “Piero Manzoni: A Retrospective” was what is known as a 
                                                      
68  Alloway, supra note 48. 
69  Brian Wallis, Public Funding and Alternative Spaces, in ALTERNATIVE ART, NEW YORK, 1965-
1985 164, 164 (Julie Ault ed., 2002). 
70 Joseph McLellan, NEA: The First 20 Years; Looking Back On the Up-and-Down Union of 
Government and Art, WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 1985), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/1985/09/26/nea-the-first-20-years/5e31fcb3-f712-48f8-
8a16-8b50915bb9c1/?utm_term=.f5996c3760c0 [perma.cc/S68K-B6WP]. 
71 See, e.g., National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998); Jackie Demaline, 
Mapplethorpe battle changed art world, THE CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, May 21, 2001, 
http://www.enquirer.com/editions/2000/05/21/loc_mapplethorpe_battle.html [perma.cc/ZU86-ESLK].  
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“museum quality gallery show” put on by the Gagosian Gallery in New York. 72  
Germano Celant, a well-known Italian art historian, curated the exhibit, and used the 
works of Manzoni’s contemporaries in the show to help illustrate the art historical and 
political context of the artist.  While the exhibition ostensibly was meant to be didactic, 
like that of any museum show, the exhibition ultimately was about the sale of art – even 
if only one or two lone pieces were for sale among the many exhibited.  This wide 
sweeping and well researched “museum quality gallery show” is not unique, and 
increasingly galleries stage similar exhibitions. 73   A more recent example is Yayoi 
Kusama’s museum quality gallery show “I Who Have Arrived in Heaven” at David 
Zwirner Gallery in New York City, which was compared to both Fireflies on the Water 
(2002), an artwork that she exhibited at the Whitney American Museum of Art, as well as 
Rain Room (2012), an artwork created by art collective Random International that 
appeared at MoMA around the same time.74  In addition, a new crop of nonprofit private 
art museums that have been established by private collectors have also recently entered 
the art exhibition scene.75  Facing increased competition for art audiences from galleries, 
private art museums and other forms of cultural entertainment, attendance and revenues 
at nonprofit public art museums are down, even as their admission fees remain some of 
the lowest among all kinds of museums.   
III. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
All of the foregoing art market factors contribute to museums’ identity crisis76 
and precarious financial position, and their acceptance of crayola gallery sponsorship is 
therefore predictable.  The question is whether such reliance is or should be permissible 
in light of current rules on the commercial and noncommercial exhibition of art. 
A. Federal Tax Exemption under the Internal Revenue Code’s Operational 
and Other Tests 
The Internal Revenue Code exempts organizations from federal income tax under 
section 501(a) if they meet the requirements of section 501(c) or (d).  Section 501(c)(3) 
includes, among others, entities the conduct of which is charitable or educational 
purposes.  Federal tax law recognizes “promotion of the arts” as an exempt charitable or 
educational purpose, but any organization that exhibits art must still apply to the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) for exemption from taxation.  If successful, the IRS will 
                                                      
72  Howard Halle, PIERO MANZONI, “A RETROSPECTIVE” | ART | REVIEWS, GUIDES, THINGS TO DO, 
FILM TIME OUT NEW YORK (2009), http://www.timeout.com/newyork/art/piero-manzoni-a-retrospective 
[perma.cc/5CPZ-392T]. 
73  Hilarie M. Sheets, Female Artists Are (Finally) Getting Their Turn, N. Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/03/arts/design/the-resurgence-of-women-only-art-shows.html 
[perma.cc/YCB3-KCFQ]. 
74  William Grimes, Yayoi Kusama’s “Mirrored Room” at David Zwirner Gallery, N. Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 1, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/02/arts/design/yayoi-kusamas-mirrored-room-at-david-
zwirner-gallery.html [perma.cc/9Q8J-46M2]. 
75  Nizan Cohen Art Collectors Gain Tax Benefits From Private Museums, N. Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/11/business/art-collectors-gain-tax-benefits-from-private-
museums.html [perma.cc/KNE9-6GHD]; Nizan Shaked, Something out of Nothing: Marcia Tucker, Jeffrey 
Deitch and the Deregulation of the ContemporaryMuseum Model, ART & EDUC., 
http://www.artandeducation.net/paper/somethingoutofnothingmarciatuckerjeffreydeitchandthederegulationoft
hecontemporarymuseummodel/ [perma.cc/QP53-87NR] (describing trend of private individuals establishing 
museums).  
76   PROCH & SPIRITO, supra note 48.  
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recognize the art organization’s exemption pursuant to a determination letter, and 
thereafter it may pursue, tax-free, activities that are in furtherance of its exempt purpose.   
In order to receive and maintain tax-exempt treatment under Section 501(c)(3) of 
the Internal Revenue Code, an organization must be organized and operated 
“exclusively” 77 for one or more exempt purposes.78  With respect to exempt purpose, 
activities conducted for cultural and artistic purposes can qualify as exempt. 79  
Specifically, exhibition of art,80 and promotion of the arts generally, has consistently been 
recognized by courts as both charitable and educational,81  two categories of exempt 
purpose under Section 501(c)(3).82  Museums are expressly identified by the Treasury 
Regulations as educational organizations under section 501(c)(3), and recent IRS 
decisions confirm the exempt status of museums.83  The organizational test likewise does 
not present a significant obstacle to organizations that exhibit art.  In relevant part,84 the 
organizational test requires that the organizational documents pursuant to which an 
exempt organization is established limit its purpose to only exempt activities.  Such 
documents must not expressly empower it to engage in activities that further non-exempt 
purposes, unless those activities are an insubstantial part of the organization’s overall 
activities.85 
 Notwithstanding a recognized exempt purpose and formation documents that 
comply with the organizational test, the presence of substantial nonexempt activities 
mean that the organization is not operated exclusively for an exempt purpose, as required 
by the operational test.86  Whether an activity is substantial is a fact-determination for 
which there is no formal definition; it has been measured by both importance to the 
                                                      
77 Better Business Bureau of Washington, D.C., Inc. v. United States, 326 U.S. 279 100 (1945) 
(“The presence of a single [nonexempt] purpose, if substantial in nature, will destroy exemption regardless of 
the number or importance of truly [exempt] purposes.”); Universal Church of Jesus Christ, Inc. v. Comm’r, 
55 T.C.M. (CCH) 143 (1988).  In addition, a “primary purpose” test looks at an organization’s purposes, and 
asks whether the organization’s activities accomplish one or more tax-exempt purposes. 
78  Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(a)-(d).  
79  Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(d)(2) and (3)(ii); Rev. Rul. 65-271, 1965-2 C.B. 161. 
80  Rev. Rul. 66-178, 1966-1 C.B. 138. See also, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. Museum & Gallery v.  
Comm’r, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 3120 (1996). 
81   See Goldsboro Art League, Inc. v. Comm’r, 75 T.C. 337 (1980). See also Plumstead Theatre 
Soc., Inc. v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 1324 (1980). 
82   Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(d)(1). 
83   P.L.R. 2007–34–024 (May 30, 2007). 
84   In addition to the requirements of the organizational test specified here, the organizational 
documents of an organization seeking tax exemption must specify that the organization will dedicate its 
assets to an exempt purpose in the case of its dissolution.  Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(b)(4).  The 
organization’s documents also may not give the organization characteristics of an action organization.  An 
organization is an action organization if it has at least one of the three following characteristics: a substantial 
part of the organization’s activities is attempting to influence legislation, by propaganda or otherwise; the 
organization participates or intervenes, directly or indirectly, in any political campaign on behalf of or in 
opposition to any candidate for public office; or the organization’s main or primary objective(s) may be 
attained only by legislation or defeat of proposed legislation and the organization advocates or campaigns for 
the attainment of such main or primary objective(s).  See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(c)(3).  However, these 
requirements are not applicable to museum organizations, and therefore this Article omits further discussion 
of them. 
85 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(b)(2). 
86 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(c)(1). 
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organization87 as well as size (e.g., the amount of revenues and/or expenditures vs. other 
revenues/expenditures of the organization, the number of employees involved and so 
forth).88 One court found that less than 10% of nonexempt activity did not jeopardize 
exempt status,89 while more than 30% seemed too much to another.90 The operational test 
focuses on the actual purposes the organization advances by means of its activities, 91 and 
is a question of fact to be determined under the facts and circumstances of each case.92  
The operational test under section 501(c)(3) generally focuses on the purpose 
accomplished by, rather than the nature of, any activity.93  The organization bears the 
burden of demonstrating that it meets and continues to operate in compliance with the 
requirements under Section 501(c)(3), the Treasury Regulations, IRS interpretations and 
judicially constructed doctrines.94  
Among other reasons,95 an organization may fail the operational test if any of its 
net earnings are “private inurement” and benefit any person having a personal and private 
interest in the activities of the organization.96  In addition, courts have imposed another 
test, now baked into the statutory framework of Section 501(c)(3), known as the “private 
benefit doctrine.” This test applies not only to an organization‘s insiders captured in the 
private inurement test, but also prohibits an organization from operating to benefit 
disinterested private interests to more than an insubstantial extent.97  Such benefits may 
include advantage, profit, privilege, gain, or interest.98  A separate, non-statutory test 
known as the “commerciality doctrine” further considers the nature of an organization’s 
                                                      
87  See, e.g., Christian Echoes Nat’l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 855-56 (10th Cir. 
1972) (opining that the “no substantial part” test for the lobbying limitation is not purely a mathematical 
assessment but rather a balancing test that measures how important lobbying is to the underlying objectives 
of the organization). 
88  Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e) (2008) (stating that whether the operation of an unrelated business 
is a primary purpose of an organization is measured in part by “the size and extent of the trade or business 
and the size and extent of the activities which are in furtherance of one or more exempt purposes.”).  See, 
e.g., Goldsboro Art League, Inc. v. Comm’r, 75 T.C. 337, 341-342 (1980) (rejecting the IRS’s argument that 
exemption should be denied to Goldsboro because it operated two art galleries at which it sold art to the 
public in part because of the minor amount of money involved (gross receipts never exceeded $6,500 per 
year, and profits were negligible).  
89   World Family Corp. v. Comm’r, 81 T.C. 958, 100 (1983). 
90   Orange County Agric. Soc’y, Inc. v. Comm’r, 55 T.C.M. 1602, 1604 (1988), aff’d, 893 F.2d 
647 (2nd Cir. 1990). 
91   Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(c)(1); see Living Faith, Inc. v. Comm’r, 950 F. 2d 365, 371 (7th 
Cir. 1991). 
92   See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(f)(1). 
93   Federation Pharmacy Services v. Comm’r, 72 T.C. 687 (T.C. 1979), aff’d, 625 F. 2d 804 (8th 
Cir. 1980). 
94   See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(f)(1). 
95  An organization will also fail the operational test if it is an action organization.  See supra note 
84, infra. 
96  Treas. Reg. § 1.501(a)–1(c); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(c)(2).  United Cancer Council, Inc. v. 
Comm’r, 165 F. 3d 1173, 1176 (7th Cir. 1999) (interpreting the term “private shareholders or individuals” to 
mean insiders of the organization – the founder, members of the board, their families, or anyone else 
equivalent to an owner or manager of the organization). 
97   See Am. Campaign Academy v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1053 (T.C. 1989); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-
1(d)(1)(ii).  It is sometimes impossible for organizations to serve exempt public purposes without providing 
benefits to private individuals.  Accordingly, substantial private benefit that is incidental to the primary 
public benefit provided by an organization’s operations does not jeopardize the organization’s tax-exempt 
status. See Rev. Rul. 70-186, 1970-1 C.B. 128 (Jan. 1970). 
98  See Retired Teachers Legal Def. Fund v. Comm’r, 78 T.C. 280, 286 (T.C. 1982). 
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activities and if the manner of its conduct transforms its stated exempt purpose into a 
nonexempt, commercial purpose.99  Increasingly, the Internal Revenue Service is relying 
on the commerciality doctrine’s “smell test” as the lines between for-profit and non-profit 
activities become messier.  Partnership with a for-profit organization may cause nonprofit 
organizations to run afoul of any of these limitations under certain circumstances.  Private 
inurement, private benefit and the commerciality doctrine have presented challenges to 
art museums and other nonprofit art organizations that display art.  The application of 
these operational test rules and limitations to nonprofit organizations that exhibit art, 
independently or jointly in cooperation with a for-profit entity, is discussed in more detail 
in Part IV below. 
Even when a nonprofit organization possesses an exempt purpose and passes the 
organizational and operational tests, it may still be subject to tax upon certain activities 
that are unrelated to its exempt purpose.  Specifically, activities unrelated to an 
organization’s purpose, but that do not rise to the level of being conducted for a 
commercial purpose, may be subject to tax for generating unrelated business income 
(UBIT).100  In order to qualify as taxable unrelated business income, income must come 
from a trade or business, such trade or business must be regularly carried on by the 
organization, and the conduct of such trade or business must not be substantially related, 
other than through production of funds, to the organization’s performance of its exempt 
functions.101  The “fragmentation” rule permits the IRS to apply the UBIT to separate 
revenue streams, even if those revenue streams are part of a single business.102  For 
example, the fragmentation rule allows the IRS to apply the UBIT to the sale of souvenir 
pens at a museum gift shop, but not to sales of postcards with art reproductions.103  
The primary objective of UBIT is to eliminate a source of unfair competition by 
taxing the income from unrelated business activities of exempt organizations the same as 
the income earned by nonexempt businesses with which the exempt organizations’ 
business activities compete.104  By imposing this tax, regulators can sanction exempt 
organizations engaging in unrelated business activities without revoking exemption 
entirely.105  Generally, unrelated business activities must be a less than substantial part of 
an exempt organization’s overall activities or the organization will lose its exemption.106  
Substantiality is often determined by looking the ratio of unrelated business income to 
total income107 – with this method, a ratio of about one-third has found to be “substantial” 
                                                      
99   Living Faith, Inc. v. Comm’r, 950 F 2d 365, 371 (1991). See also BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW 
OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS (10th ed. 2011). 
100   Treas. Reg. § 1.513–1(a). 
101   Id. 
102   I.R.C. § 513(c) (stating that “an activity does not lose identity as trade or business merely 
because it is carried on within a larger aggregate of similar activities or within a larger complex of other 
endeavors which may, or may not, be related to the exempt purpose of the organization”); Treas. Reg. 
§1.513-1(b). 
103  Rev. Rul. 73-105, 1973-1 C.B. 264 (1973) (sales of art reproductions are substantially related, 
but sales of science books and general souvenir items relating to city in which art museum was located were 
not substantially related to museum’s exempt purpose of promoting public understanding of art.).  See also 
Rev. Rul. 73-104, 1973-1 C.B. 263 (1973) (sales of postcards with art reproductions are not subject to UBIT). 
104  Treas. Reg. § 1.513–1(b). 
105  HOPKINS, supra note 99, at 634.  
106  See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(c)(1); Rev. Rul. 66-221, 1966-1 C.B. 220 (1966). 
107  Rev. Rul. 64-182, 1964–1 C.B. 186 (1964); see also HOPKINS, supra note 99, at 635. 
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and thus disqualified an organization from exemption.108  However, the IRS occasionally 
applies a “commensurate test,” under which it will permit substantial unrelated business 
income where the exempt organization also spends a significant amount of time or funds 
on exempt functions.109  
Profitable activities have recently gained greater relevance to art museums and 
nonprofit organizations that display art, as exhibitions and other revenue-generating 
activities become a critical source of funding.  Many kinds of activities undertaken by 
museums have not been considered impermissibly commercial in nature, including the 
operation of retail and gift shops, restaurants, event space rental, and even direct sale and 
lending of original artworks by the art museum.  In some cases, these activities also are 
considered to take place in furtherance of a museum’s purpose and remain untaxed.110  
The application of the UBIT rules as applied specifically in the context of art exhibition 
activities by nonprofit organizations is discussed in more detail in Part IV, below. 
B. Self-Regulatory Industry Associations and Museum Guidance 
Many professional self-regulatory associations, such as the American Alliance of 
Museums (AAM), the Association of Art Museum Directors (AADM), the Association of 
Art Museum Curators (AAMC) and the College Art Association (CAA), exist as a means 
of promoting communication as well as uniform policies and ethical guidelines among 
museums, arts organizations and arts professionals.111  The organizations are based on 
voluntary memberships, but joining creates certain responsibilities, in addition to 
benefits, for the museum.  The AAM is the most prestigious museum organization in the 
United States and offers an accreditation process for arts institutions.  AAM accreditation 
gives both credibility to the institution among the arts community and broader funding 
opportunities, since many arts grants will only be given to AAM accredited museums.112  
                                                      
108  Orange County Agric. Soc'y., Inc. v. Comm’r, 893 F 2d 529 (1990). 
109  HOPKINS, supra note 99, at 636. 
110 Whether gallery-supported art exhibitions constitute an activity in furtherance of an art 
museum’s exempt purpose may depend on the meaning of “in furtherance of,” a concept which remains 
unsettled under federal tax law.  The key issue is whether “in furtherance of” means that the activity must 
functionally advance exempt purpose, or simply that profits therefrom are used in commensurate proportion 
to exempt activities.  In general, court cases and IRS rulings provide support for both interpretations.  
Assuming that art exhibitions funded by galleries are commercial and therefore not an activity that advances 
a museum’s exempt purpose for all the reasons provided above, the distinction in interpretations may have 
consequences for a museum’s exempt status.  If “in furtherance of” means that the profits from gallery-
supported art exhibitions support a commensurate amount of other charitable activities, they are likely to 
withstand the challenge in light of the other activities art museums undertake to promote art.  According to 
the 2015 AAMD Annual Report, museums spend approximately 51 to 67 percent of their annual budget on 
programs or program-related expenses.  ASS’N OF ART MUSUEM DIRECTORS, Art Museums By the Numbers 
2015, ASS’N OF ART MUSUEM DIRECTORS (2016), http://aamd.org/our-members/from-the-field/art-museums-
by-the-numbers-2015 [perma.cc/5KGQ-CT67].  However, if “in furtherance of” means functional relation, 
commercial – and therefore functionally unrelated – gallery-supported museum exhibitions could endanger 
museum’s exempt status to the extent they are substantial in relation to the museum’s overall activities.  
111 AM. ALLIANCE OF MUSEUMS, About Us, AM. ALLIANCE MUSEUMS, http://www.aam-
us.org/about-us [perma.cc/3895-AFEV]; ASS’N OF ART MUSEUM DIRECTORS, Mission, ASS’N OF ART 
MUSUEM DIRECTORS, https://www.aamd.org/about/mission [perma.cc/U67E-ZEF3]; ASS’N OF ART MUSEUM 
CURATORS, Mission & Vision, ASS’N OF ART MUSEUM CURATORS, 
http://www.artcurators.org/?page=MissionVision [perma.cc/943Z-3CEE]; COLLEGE ART ASS’N, About CAA, 
COLLEGE ART ASS’N, http://www.collegeart.org/about/ [perma.cc/73AG-ACSX].  
112 AM. ALLIANCE MUSEUMS, Benefits of Accreditation, AM. ALLIANCE MUSEUMS, http://www.aam-
us.org/resources/assessment-programs/accreditation/benefits [perma.cc/9YDP-MQUB].  
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More specialized organizations, such as the AADM, offer a forum for museum staff to 
share information with each other and stay current with various practices.  In addition, the 
organizations often put forward guidelines or best practices in their respective fields 
regarding professional ethics.113  
Consequences of violating the guidelines may result in discipline by reprimand, 
suspension, expulsion from the association and even sanctions, such as suspension of 
loans and shared exhibitions with members.  While a minimum effort to follow the 
organizations’ guidelines is necessary on the part of museums or specific staff members 
to maintain their membership, 114  the professional organizations have no power of 
enforcement over museum activities.  Similarly, an association’s power to enforce 
sanctions is also limited.115 
No museum association requires a policy be in place for museums working with 
corporations or other for-profit entities.  The AAMD provides a series of questions that 
museums are encouraged to consider when working with either a for-profit, a donor, or a 
corporation.  The AAM provides guidelines that are meant to be employed by individual 
museums to create their own specific policy for working with corporations.  However, 
there is no specific warning against working with corporations or other for-profit 
institutions.  The AAM simply cautions museums to be aware of the risk and the potential 
consequences of working with these entities and to avoid practices that provide an 
individual or business with benefits at the expense of the museum’s mission, reputation, 
or the community it serves.  The AAMC addresses employment of curators by dealers.  It 
also addresses curators’ acceptance of compensation from dealers in their personal 
capacity, but seems directed at compensation in curators’ personal capacity and not on 
behalf of the museum.116 
Significant variation exists in what guidelines, if any, have been adopted by 
individual museums regarding gallery financing of museum exhibitions.  Infrequently, 
museums’ written guidelines may explicitly prohibit acceptance of financial 
                                                      
113 ASS’N OF ART MUSEUM DIRECTORS, Code of Ethics, ASS’N OF ART MUSEUM DIRECTORS, 
http://www.aamd.org/about/code-of-ethics [perma.cc/J7YB-8WLG]; AM. ALLIANCE MUSEUMS, Ethics, 
Standards, and Best Practices, AM. ALLIANCE MUSEUMS, http://www.aam-us.org/resources/ethics-standards-
and-best-practices [perma.cc/ZMR2-64AU]; COLLEGE ART ASS’N., Standards and Guidelines, COLLEGE ART 
ASS’N, http://www.collegeart.org/guidelines/ [perma.cc/XRM4-US3C]; ASS’N OF ART MUSUEM DIRECTORS, 
supra note 113; ASS’N OF ART MUSEUM CURATORS, Professional Practices for Art Museum Curators (2007), 
http://www.collegeart.org/pdf/AAMC_Professional_Practices.pdf [perma.cc/U5CQ-BTGA]. 
114 Margie Fishman, Delaware Art Museum Loses Accreditation, DELAWARE ONLINE (June 19, 
2014), http://www.delawareonline.com/story/life/2014/06/18/museum-directors-sanction-delaware-art-
museum/10757111/ [perma.cc/672M-KGYM] (describing loss of AAM accreditation by the Delaware Art 
Museum after it sold one of their paintings in order to pay museum operating costs, which is against the 
ethical guidelines of the AAM).  
115 See ASS’N OF ART MUSEUM DIRECTORS, Ass'n of Art Museum Directors Sanctions Delaware Art 
Museum, ASS’N OF ART MUSEUM DIRECTORS (June 18, 2014), http://aamd.org/for-the-media/press-
release/association-of-art-museum-directors-sanctions-delaware-art-museum [perma.cc/N3N6-6EMY]; 
ASS’N OF ART MUSEUM DIRECTORS, Ass'n of Art Museum Directors Statement on Randolph College and 
Maier Museum of Art, ASS’N OF ART MUSEUM DIRECTORS (Mar. 12, 2014), http://aamd.org/for-the-
media/press-release/association-of-art-museum-directors-statement-on-randolph-college-and 
[perma.cc/6FVD-HCZV]. 
116 ASS’N OF ART MUSUEM CURATORS, supra note 113. 
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compensation (including donations) from dealers for any reason,117 whether or not related 
to an exhibition, or more narrowly prohibit compensation for certain types of exhibition-
related expenses. 118   Other written museum policies may address certain aspects of 
gallery relationships with museums, such as artwork loans to galleries, but do not 
specifically address gallery sponsorship of a museum’s art exhibitions. 119   Some 
museums may have general conflict of interest policies that allow donations for any 
general or special purpose of the museum, provided that they do not undermine the 
museum’s best interest or the public’s confidence in the museum’s integrity.120  In other 
cases, policies are either publicly unavailable 121  or available upon request, 122  and it 
therefore unclear whether there exist any written policies on gallery donations for 
exhibitions or otherwise. 
C. Informal Art Market Norms 
Social norms are one of four modalities by which behavior may be regulated or 
constrained, as Lawrence Lessig observes in setting forth his “New Chicago School” 
regulatory theory.123  Therefore, no discussion of the rules applicable to the funding by 
galleries of art museum exhibitions can be complete without acknowledging the art 
industry’s “relatively heteronomous”124 norms and overarching informal nature.  A brief 
summary of relevant art market dynamics recently examined by an art industry expert, 
Professor Isabelle Graw, follows.   
Experts including Professor Graw describe the art market as an “informal 
economy” thriving on personal agreements, unwritten laws, casual conversations, and a 
distinctive language, logic and set of laws.125  This leads to “practices capable of plunging 
                                                      
117 MOMA, CODE OF CONDUCT FOR STAFF OF THE MUSEUM OF MODERN ART (2001), 
http://moma.org/momaorg/shared/pdfs/docs/about/code_of_conduct_staff_4.2014.pdf [perma.cc/98LF-
L6C3].  
118 Finkel, supra note 4 (citing Walker Museum of Art’s written guidelines). 
119 See, e.g., MOMA, COLLECTIONS MANAGEMENT POLICY (2010), 
http://www.moma.org/momaorg/shared/pdfs/docs/explore/CollectionsMgmtPolicyMoMA_Oct10.pdf 
[perma.cc/N996-DBPF]; Whitney Museum, Collections Management Policy (2013) 
http://whitney.org/file_columns/0004/5939/cmp_december_2013.pdf [perma.cc/9CGT-2LAA]. 
120 LACMA, LACMA AUDIT COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES, POLICY AND PROCEDURES 
FOR REVIEW OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST TRANSACTIONS (2009), 
http://www.lacma.org/sites/default/files/conflict-of-interest-policy.pdf [perma.cc/Y5ZH-NKMK]; LACMA, 
AMENDED AND RESTATED BYLAWS OF MUSEUM ASSOCIATES AS OF JANUARY 13, 2016 (Jan 13, 2016), 
http://www.lacma.org/sites/default/files/LACMA_Amended_and_Restated_Bylaws_1_13_16.pdf 
[perma.cc/R4Q4-W776] (last visited Jul 20, 2016). 
121 Id. 
122 See Christopher Knight, MOCA’s questionable painting loan to a Culver City art gallery, L.A. 
TIMES, (June 11, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/arts/culture/la-et-cm-moca-loan-frank-stella-
honor-fraser-gallery-20140610-column.html  [perma.cc/MM5B-CNNG] (referring to a written museum 
policy obtained by email request).  
123 Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 662 (1998). 
124 GRAW, supra note 2, at 142 (defining relative heteronomy in contrast to relative autonomy, to 
mean that external constraints – primarily the economy and the market – prevail, but only in a relative 
fashion due to the specific rules and conditions of the art world). 
125 Id. at 62 (“Anyone entering the art market as a novice will inevitably be confronted with 
business practices that would be quite unthinkable in conventional business relationships.  As if it were the 
most natural thing in the world, collectors cancel orders payments are delayed, and invoices simply ignored. 
Not to mention the large amounts of ‘dirty’ money that circulate in this field on account of the many 
transactions ‘off the books.’”).  See JUDITH B. PROWDA, VISUAL ARTS AND THE LAW: A HANDBOOK FOR 
PROFESSIONALS 182 (ed. 2013) (“The art world is one where relationships play an inestimable role between 
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any accountant into disrepair,” as well as price manipulation and insider trading. 126  
Rather than brazen disregard for rule of law and moral deficiency, however, Professor 
Graw believes that the “the reason why this market has developed its own, unorthodox 
practices . . . lies in its product – the work of art – which itself eludes economic 
categories.” 127   The value of art is determined, and uniquely characterized, by both 
symbolic and market value.  In turn, this dualistic nature of art’s value has implications 
on the professional profiles of and interactions between museums and galleries. 
The symbolic and market values of art remain conceptually distinct and in 
conflict with one another; at the same time, they are dependent upon each other and 
inextricably fused.128  Art’s market value derives necessarily from its existence within a 
capitalist system, with its price determined by buyers and sellers who agree upon an 
amount for which to exchange it.129  In turn, this value and its expression as a price is 
driven by art’s symbolic value, which goes beyond what economic terms can measure.  
Symbolic value is about cultural relevance, and is an expression of the manner in which 
art is loaded with idealistic concepts, such as an “artist’s reputation, promise of 
originality, prospect of duration, claim to autonomy and intellectual acumen” as well as 
the artwork’s singularity and “arthistorical verdict.” 130   These concepts (and thus 
symbolic value) are negotiated by a broad range of contributors, including the art 
historians, critics, curators – and also more recently, the art market itself.131  In contrast to 
art’s prior tolerance of its market value during the 1970s and 1980s as a “necessary 
means for making sadly inevitable financial transactions,” the nature of art’s market 
value as relative and conditional is now obscured as an end in itself.132  
                                                                                                                                                   
transacting parties…Buyers and sellers alike must rely on the personal relationships and integrity of such 
intermediaries. This system of reliance often leads to artworks of great value changing hands in an informal 
manner…”).  
126 GRAW, supra note 2, at 45 (describing collusion between buyers at auctions and the minimum 
auction price guarantees that auction houses grant to sellers); Id. at 61 (describing the art market to know 
only unwritten laws and be rife with murky goings-on).  See also John Gapper & Peter Aspden, Davos 2015: 
Nouriel Roubini says art market needs regulation, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2015), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/992dcf86-a250-11e4-aba2-00144feab7de.html#axzz4B9DT8w1u 
[perma.cc/Q8NS-LACC].  
127 GRAW, supra note 2, at 147.  But see Andrew M. Goldstein, Would the Art Market Benefit From 
More Regulation?, ARTSPACE (Jan. 28, 2013), http://www.artspace.com/magazine/news_events/1_28_13 
[perma.cc/2AD9-ENAD] (stating that the key reason that art market regulation has been difficult to achieve is 
that galleries do not comply with the law requiring listing of prices).  
128 GRAW, supra note 2, at 7 (describing art as a “dialectical unity of opposites, an opposition 
whose poles effectively form a single unit.”).  See generally MARTHA BUSKIRK, CREATIVE ENTERPRISE: 
CONTEMPORARY ART BETWEEN MUSEUM AND MARKETPLACE (3rd ed. 2012) (describing inseparable dynamics 
of art and business of art).  
129 GRAW, supra note 2, at 29; DIEDRICH DIEDERICHSEN, ON (SURPLUS) VALUE IN ART (2008); 
THORNTON, supra note 8, at 100 (“On one level, the art market is understood as the supply and demand of art, 
but on another, it is an economy of belief.”).  
130 GRAW, supra note 2, at 26–27.  See THORNTON, supra note 8, at 100 (describing the art market 
as a “symbolic economy” in which artwork is made by artists, dealers, curators, critics and collectors); see 
also GRAW, supra note 2, at 20–21 (stating that art’s symbolic value is the “surplus and an assumption of 
meaning and worth that goes beyond the concrete object used to refer to it”).  
131 GRAW, supra note 2, at 21. 
132 Id. at 55.  See THORNTON, supra note 8, at 100 (“Many worry that the validation of a market 
price has come to overshadow other forms of reaction, like positive criticism, art prizes and museum 
shows.”). 
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Today, art’s symbolic value remains its driving force, but “[d]uring the art boom 
of the first years of the new millennium, market success became the measure of all 
things, while at the same time remaining curiously dependent on the consecrating 
authorities that vouch for symbolic importance (criticism, art history, the museum).”133  
The result is that the market significantly influences the process of value creation more 
than critics do,134 even while market value alone is no guarantee for long-term symbolic 
importance.135  The convergence of art’s driving values has compelled previously distinct 
professional spheres to similarly merge within the art industry.136  Art industry actors 
have embraced broader professional profiles that span both market and non-market roles, 
such as the collector-dealer who also functions as a curator or publicist, or auction 
houses’ acquisition of ownership stakes in galleries.137   Increasingly, each hybrid art 
industry actor acts in cooperation with other hybrid art industry actors.138  Accordingly, 
“few figures in the art world are entirely free of conflicting roles, although these conflicts 
are hardly experienced as such” in light of the prevailing demand for transdisciplinarity 
across all art industry actors,139 with art criticism in particular undergoing a change in 
function.140 
The blurring of the “commercial” and “institutional” spheres is a bid for 
symbolic legitimacy on the part of market actors as much as it is a general tendency 
toward market imperialism.141  Yet Professor Graw acknowledges that the problem is not 
the lack of a rigid division of labor.  She nonetheless emphasizes that it “makes a 
difference whether [an art industry actor] cultivates an awareness of [conflicts] in order to 
consciously set limits on them, or whether one simply neglects the problem, considering 
oneself separate from the conditions of market.”142  
IV. CRITIQUING GALLERY-SUPPORTED ART EXHIBITIONS 
As the analysis in this Part IV demonstrates, examining gallery-supported art 
exhibitions results in the following conclusions.  Gallery-supported art exhibitions are 
unlikely to confer private inurement, but may bestow private benefit upon galleries and 
artists in limited circumstances – especially when nonprofit art organizations do not fully 
control the exhibitions, when gallery donations preference artists for consideration in an 
art exhibition, and when the sponsorship rights granted to a gallery in exchange for 
making a donation facilitate galleries’ ability to sell art outside of the art exhibition.  
Gallery-supported art exhibitions may be impermissibly commercial when sponsored by 
commercial galleries; however, only if gallery-supported art exhibitions are also found to 
comprise a substantial part of a museum’s activities do they threaten museum’s exempt 
                                                      
133 GRAW, supra note 2, at 54.  See Plattner, supra note 55, at 8 (describing the increase in the 
market’s weight in determining short-term artistic relevance). 
134 Id. at 121.  See THORNTON, supra note 8, at 100 (describing how auctions “market-test” 
artwork). 
135  Id. at 26;. See THORNTON, supra note 8, at 100 (describing the test for artistic authenticity as 
“the perceived depth and longevity of [artists’] ‘intervention’ in art history”). 
136  Id. at 99. 
137 Id. at 99–100. 
138 See generally id. at 103–06. 
139 Id. at 102-03. 
140 Id. at 229. 
141 Russell, supra note 64 (discussing the relationship between symbolic and financial capital); 
GRAW, supra note 2, at 44.  
142 GRAW, supra note 2, at 102. 
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status.  Meaningful, enforced self-regulation and internal norms against gallery-supported 
museum exhibitions are all but absent, even as the industry itself recognizes the 
troublingly close nature of gallery-museum relationships.  This state of affairs is, at least 
in part, a result of the current structure of the art market, with galleries at its center.   
A. Exempt Purpose and Its Exclusive Pursuit in Question 
1. Private Inurement 
Private inurement has the potential to present issues for museums that conduct 
gallery-supported art exhibitions.143  Private inurement is well defined by the IRS and the 
courts as siphoning off the assets of an exempt organization to an insider.  This may 
occur when the charity charges too little for property or services it provides to an insider 
(some examples in the museum context might be free event space rental or curatorial 
services).  Alternatively, private inurement may also occur when a charity overpays for 
property or services provided by an insider (for example, an unreasonable salary or other 
compensation in excess of market value).  Even de minimis private inurement violates the 
operational test and threatens an organization’s exempt status as a whole.  However, in 
lieu of revoking exemption, the penalty for inurement transactions in most cases is not 
revocation of exempt status, but the imposition of excise taxes under Section 4958.   
The IRS has issued guidance to clarify the factors it will consider in determining 
whether to revoke the exempt status of a tax-exempt organization that engages in excess 
benefit transactions such as private inurement. 144   In providing such guidance, now 
officially reflected in the Treasury Regulations, the IRS specifically addressed the 
situation in which a museum and art dealers have too cozy of a relationship.  The first 
such example provided in the Treasury Regulations interpreting Section 4958 describes 
an art museum created for the purpose of exhibiting art to the general public, and 
governed by a board comprised of art dealers.145  The museum directly purchases art 
solely from the dealers at prices exceeding fair market value, and the museum exhibits 
and offers for sale all of the art it purchases.146  The IRS states that the purchase of art 
from the dealers constitutes private inurement.147  Furthermore, the IRS compares the 
museum’s activities to “dealing in such art in a manner similar to a commercial art 
gallery”.148 Notably, the IRS states that such transactions are so significant in size and 
scope in relation to the museum’s exempt purpose that, unless remedied,149 they would 
                                                      
143 Although arts administrators’ salaries have significantly risen in recent years, this Article sets 
aside the private inurement issue of unreasonable compensation to administrators in art museums as a general 
and tangential issue, despite whatever contribution to higher salaries is facilitated by the operational budget 
savings made possible in part by galleries’ donations.  See RM Vaughn, Point of View: Who makes up the 
1%? In the arts, it’s the bureaucrats, CBC (July 8, 2016), http://www.cbc.ca/beta/arts/point-of-view-who-
makes-up-the-1-in-the-arts-it-s-the-bureaucrats-1.3607715 [perma.cc/2TYG-TERS]. 
144 T.D. 9390, 2008-18 I.R.B. 852, 855 (2008), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb08-18.pdf 
[perma.cc/Z3WU-WVLG]. 
145 Treas. Reg. § 1-501(c)(3)-1(f)(2)(iv) Examples 1-3. 
146 Treas. Reg. § 1-501(c)(3)-1(f)(2)(iv) Example 1(i). 
147 Treas. Reg. § 1-501(c)(3)-1(f)(2)(iv) Example 1(ii). 
148 Treas. Reg. § 1-501(c)(3)-1(f)(2)(iv) Example 1(iii). 
149 The IRS indicates elsewhere in the Treasury Regulation that a museum’s exempt status would 
not be in question if it addresses the conflicts presented by museum-dealer transactions.  Specifically, if the 
museum replaces its board with “members of the community who are not in the business of buying or selling 
art and who have skills and experience running charitable and educational programs and institutions”; no 
longer buys art from current or former board members; and adopts written conflict of interest and art 
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cause the museum to lose its exempt status.150  This is an extreme example, and it does 
not explicitly address the situation in which a third-party gallery funds a museum show; 
nonetheless, at a more general level the example highlights the concern of the IRS with 
dealers who financially benefit from, and are involved in the decision-making that takes 
place at, an art museum.   
Significantly, the mere exhibition of art – even in the absence of a sale – also 
results in excess benefit to someone who has a financial interest in that art, due to the 
“nature of art” and the impact display has on its value.151  The IRS directly acknowledged 
this in its 1992 Private Letter Ruling 9408006, stating:  
There is no requirement that an [art] exhibition be of a commercial 
nature or that a sale must accompany an exhibition for the exhibition to 
result in private benefit.  The nature of art is such that every exhibition 
increases the value of each piece on display and the value of all other 
works of that artist, including those pieces presently in existence and 
those that the artist will create in the future.152 
The IRS made this sweeping pronouncement in the course of examining the exempt 
status of a 501(c)(3) organization formed to further the promotion of textile art.  The 
board governing the organization consisted of the organization’s former attorney, as well 
as a well-known textile artist, her husband and her brother-in-law; in addition, the artist 
and her husband were the sole contributors to the organization.  Although the 
organization stated in its application for exemption that it planned to develop textile 
artists, sponsor educational public art events, publish materials for cultural and 
educational activities and display textile art of the highest quality, the organization’s 
actual activities told a different story.  In fact, the IRS found that the organization in 
Private Letter Ruling 9408006 almost exclusively exhibited the work of a single artist: 
namely, the well-known textile artist who was a board member and one of the 
organization’s contributors.   
The case again demonstrates the influence that an interested art industry actor – 
this time the artist herself, unaided by an intermediary gallery – can wield over a 
nonprofit art organization’s dealings.  The organization had formal selection criteria in 
place, as well as a sizable collection, that presented it with options in choosing among the 
art it wanted to promote.  Nonetheless, in most instances, the organization showed only 
the contributor-artist’s art.153  Even when the organization combined financial resources 
                                                                                                                                                   
valuation policies, the museum would retain its exempt status.  Treas. Reg. § 1-501(c)(3)–1(f)(2)(iv) Example 
2 (2008). 
150 Treas. Reg. § 1-501(c)(3) –1(f)(2)(iv) Example 1(iii) (“The size and scope of the excess benefit 
transactions collectively are significant in relation to the size and scope of any of O’s ongoing activities that 
further exempt purposes . . . [the museum] has not implemented safeguards…to prevent such transactions in 
the future. The excess benefit transactions have not been corrected, nor has [the museum] made good faith 
efforts to seek correction from the disqualified persons who benefited from the excess benefit transactions 
(the trustees). The trustees continue to control [the museum]’s Board. Based on the application of the factors 
to these facts, [the museum] is no longer described in section 501(c)(3)…”).  
151 P.L.R 94–08–006 (Dec. 4, 1992) (“The nature of art is such that every exhibition increases the 
value of each piece on display and the value of all other works of that artist, including those pieces presently 
in existence and those that the artist will create in the future.”). 
152 Id. 
153 Id. The organization sent only the contributor-artist’s work to several exhibitions in which it 
participated.  It also staged a solo exhibition of only the contributor-artist’s art that displayed pieces from her 
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to fund a group show of multiple artists, it showed only the contributor-artist’s work 
among the others from its collection.  The organization also solicited European museums 
and others to host traveling exhibitions of the contributor-artist’s art, and printed catalogs 
containing her biography and a listing of the art from her personal collection.  Although 
the organization received all proceeds from the sale of the catalog, it incurred significant 
other direct and indirect expenses of showing the contributor-artist’s work.   
The IRS ultimately revoked the organization’s exemption, rejecting the argument 
that because the contributor-artist was already well known, any benefit that she received 
was incidental and tenuous.  Instead, the IRS concluded that the contributor-artist 
received substantial “private benefit”154 from the organization’s aforementioned existence 
and activities.  This determination is consistent with a long line of IRS interpretive 
guidance and Tax Court decisions that prohibits insiders of an art organization from 
selling their art through such organizations.  The IRS recently confirmed its position in 
2014 with Private Letter Ruling 201210043, when it revoked the exemption of a 
nonprofit cooperative art gallery that not only exhibited, but also sold its members’ art.155  
The exhibiting artists were exclusively members of the organization; therefore, they were 
also insiders.  They also set prices and selected works for exhibition; significantly, the 
IRS determined that the members’ financial and in-kind donation, required by the 
organization from its member artists in order to exhibit their work, constituted a sales 
commission.  The artists received all proceeds from the sale of their art less such 
commission, thereby constituting forbidden inurement.156 
Even after this recent decision, Private Letter Ruling 9408006 remains relevant.  
Specifically, the IRS acknowledged in that case that “[t]here is no reason why [the 
contributor-artist] could not realize the appreciation resulting from the display of her art 
in a private sale of the art or donate the appreciated art for higher charitable 
deductions.”157 In other words, the IRS embraces the fluid reality of the contemporary art 
market with its recognition that there is little meaningful difference between exhibits by 
commercial art gallery or an art museum.  Both create interest in and esteem for an 
artist’s work, and both may lead to sales.  Accordingly, in light of Private Letter Ruling 
9408006, the rules against private inurement apply not only to the traditional notion of 
insiders who have significant control and a current financial interest in the art; it also 
captures insiders with significant control and only a latent or prospective financial 
interest in art.   
The critical effect of Private Letter Ruling 9407006 expands the scope of private 
inurement in a way that could encompass not only artists, but also their galleries as the 
agents who act on their behalf.  However, despite this expansion, the effect of Private 
Letter Ruling 9408006 is likely to have a greater impact on gallery sponsorship of 
                                                                                                                                                   
personal collection and one of her collector’s collections.  At other times, the organization exhibited her art 
together with some art from its own collection.  
154 Id. 
155 P.L.R. 2012–10–043 (2011).  While this decision did not deal directly with museums, it 
explicitly stated that the gallery was “like the [museum] described in Example 2 of Section 1.501(c)(3)-
1(d)(1)(iii) of the Regulations.”  
156 Id. (“Providing a display and retail space for member artists and allowing each member artist to 
set the sales price, select the works for sale, and receive a commission promotes the private interests of the 
artist members. . . since the individuals who will be selling and retaining any proceeds are members they are 
also insiders. As insiders, any direct benefit derived through your operations is inurement.”). 
157 P.L.R. 2012–10–043, supra note 155. 
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museum exhibitions from the perspective of private benefit, rather than private 
inurement.  For example, even if Takashi Murakami delegated his “final right of approval 
on all aspects of everything” over ©MURAKAMI to his gallery, this would be 
insufficient to subject the gallery to the prohibition on private inurement.  Arrangements 
that grant gallerists ultimate control over exhibitions on behalf of the artists they 
represent – in addition to their inherent financial interest – do not necessarily make 
gallerists into museum insiders.  For that to be the case, gallerists and artists would need 
to possess “significant formal voice in [an exempt organization’s] activities generally and 
. . . substantial formal and practical control over most of [the organization’s] income” like 
the contributor-artist in Private Letter Ruling 9408006 or the member artists in Private 
Letter Ruling 201210043.158  
While some art museums do indeed have artists or gallery owners in positions of 
power within their organization, the majority of gallery relationships with museums are 
temporary and transactional, formed for the purpose of producing a single exhibition.  
Gallery support of museum exhibitions tend to look more like licensing contracts or 
sponsorship agreements between the gallery and museum.  They may also take the form 
of a three-way arrangement among a donor, museum and gallery.  In such multi-party 
arrangements, a museum identifies a donor to advance money to a gallery; the gallery in 
turn contributes such funds to the museum’s exhibition of the artist; and the artist 
provides an artwork to the donor, often for less than the value of the donor’s advance to 
the gallery.  In any case, a contractual relationship alone has been ruled insufficient to 
make a third party an insider, even when the contract considerably favors such third 
party. 159   Therefore, most crayola gallery sponsorships of museum exhibitions are 
unlikely to support a finding of private inurement, and this Article’s analysis thus 
excludes further discussion of private inurement, excess benefit transactions and 
intermediate sanctions.160  However, even a short-term relationship nonetheless may still 
present a basis for challenging gallery sponsorship of museum exhibitions, from the 
perspective of a private benefit or joint venture analysis.   
2. Private Benefit 
A commercial gallery that works with a nonprofit art museum to present an 
exhibition of its artists’ work could stand to reap prohibited substantial private benefit.  In 
addition to any benefits inherent to exhibiting art in a museum (such as elevated prestige 
and greater name recognition), the private benefits associated with gallery-supported 
museums may include legal rights for the gallery or others included in negotiating the 
donation.  These benefits may be specified in the sponsorship or licensing agreement, and 
include: signage, program and advertising credits, hospitality, tie-in promotions, access to 
star personnel, merchandising, and in some cases, even ultimate control over the 
                                                      
158 See Variety Club Tent No. 6 Charities, Inc. v. Comm’r, 74 T.C.M. 1485, 1493 (1997). 
159 See United Cancer Council, Inc. v. Comm’r, 165 F.3d 1173 (7th Cir. 1999) (reversing the Tax 
Court’s finding of private inurement and remanding for consideration of private benefit present in a contract 
that gave 90% of the contributions received by the charity to the fundraising company it hired).  
160 It would be necessary to examine the individual provisions in licensing and sponsorship 
agreements to determine with greater certainty whether a commercial gallery’s relationship with a nonprofit 
museum justifies disqualified person status and thus makes the intermediate sanctions and excess benefit 
provisions applicable. 
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exhibition.161 Whether any of these benefits are permissible is determined by the rules on 
private benefit.   
Private benefit is a judicially-constructed doctrine that can cause an organization 
to lose its exemption if, as a result of serving its charitable class, it confers an excessive 
benefit (often, but not necessarily, a financial benefit) on parties outside of the charitable 
class.  Unlike private inurement transactions, the private benefit doctrine extends to 
independent, disinterested third parties to the organization, 162 even if when transactions 
are fairly and objectively priced at market value.163 
As with private inurement, the Treasury Regulations specifically address the 
example of an art museum that, in pursuing its mission of exhibiting art to the public, 
provide indirect, secondary benefits to specific individuals outside the intended charitable 
class.  In this example, the IRS describes an art museum that displays the work of 
unknown but promising artists; unlike the example provided in the case of private 
inurement, the board governing the art museum is unrelated to these artists.  Nonetheless, 
because the art exhibited is for sale pursuant to a consignment arrangement that gives the 
artist 90% of the proceeds, the primary activity of the art museum serves the artists’ 
interest, and the art museum is not exempt.164  While the IRS recently confirmed this 
position in denying exempt status to an art gallery that it deemed to be like the museum 
described in the Treasury Regulations,165 the private benefit doctrine is even broader than 
the Treasury Regulation suggests.  The key case establishing the doctrine, American 
Campaign Academy v. Commissioner, 166  disallowed exemption of an educational 
institution whose graduates nearly all worked for a single political party, and whose 
curriculum and faculty mostly originated from programs previously conducted by that 
party.  There was no evidence that the political party exerted insider influence or 
funneled off funds, yet the court still found that the political party benefitted to an 
impermissibly substantial degree.167 Therefore, while the Treasury Regulation again does 
not explicitly address the situation in which a third-party gallery funds a museum show, 
American Campaign Academy establishes that a gallery that neither exerts influence over 
an art exhibition nor improperly takes funds from the presenting art organization could 
nonetheless be the recipient of forbidden private benefit.   
                                                      
161 Mark Walhimer, The Museum Toolbox: Sample Museum Exhibit Sponsorship Agreement, 
MUSEUMS 101, 190 (2015). See also Mary Hutchins Reed, Sponsorship and the Arts: A Brief Overview of 
Legal Issues for Not-For-Profits, 13 ENT. SPORTS LAW 13 (1995) (describing common benefits provided in 
sponsorship agreements); Barstow, supra note 44 (detailing hospitality benefits provided in exchange for 
Christie's sponsorship of an exhibition at the Brooklyn Museum); THORNTON, supra note 8, at 100 
(describing contracts between artist and exhibiting museum that grant artist ultimate control). 
162 American Campaign Academy v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1053 (1989). 
163 United Cancer Council, Inc. v. Comm’r, 165 F.3d at 1176 (suggesting that a one-sided contract 
may effectively support a finding of private benefit.). 
164 Treas. Reg. § 1-501(c)(3) –1(d)(1)(iii) Example 2.  
165 P.L.R. 2015–16–066 (2015). 
166 American Campaign Academy, supra note 162. 
167 Id. 
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When taken to an extreme, the implications of American Campaign Academy are 
that exhibitions of art, gallery-supported or not, would confer private benefit to the artist 
and gallery, and call into question the exempt status of all nonprofit art institutions.  
Indeed, the exact doctrinal scope of the potentially all-encompassing private benefit 
prohibition is unclear.  It derives from IRS and court interpretations of Treasury 
Regulation §1.501(c)(3)- 1(d)(1)(ii), which provides: 
An organization is not . . . [qualified for exemption] . . . unless it serves a 
public rather than private interest. Thus . . . it is necessary for an 
organization to establish that it is not organized or operated for the 
benefit of private interests such as designated individuals, the creator or 
his family, shareholders of the organization, or persons controlled 
directly or indirectly, by such private interests.168 
The doctrine itself does not appear anywhere in the statute supposedly interpreted by 
such regulations, however.  An IRS General Counsel’s Memorandum issued in 1987 
provides the most exhaustive explanation of the doctrine available: 
An organization is not described in section 501(c)(3) if it serves a private 
interest more than incidentally…If, however, the private benefit is only 
incidental to the exempt purposes served, and not substantial, it will not 
result in a loss of exempt status … A private benefit is considered 
incidental only if it is incidental in both a qualitative and a quantitative 
sense.  In order to be incidental in a qualitative sense, the benefit must be 
a necessary concomitant of the activity which benefits the public at large, 
i.e., the activity can be accomplished only by benefiting certain private 
individuals … To be incidental in a quantitative sense, the private benefit 
must not be substantial after considering the overall public benefit 
conferred by the activity.169 
Thus, a balancing test determines the presence of private benefit by assessing the 
benefits to private individuals or organizations of an organization’s activity, against those 
received by the charitable class.  If the former is substantial, the organization is not 
exempt – even if the activity also serves the latter.  Substantial benefits may include a 
direct financial stake in an organization’s profits from its otherwise exempt activities.170  
In the context of organizations that exhibit art, several possessed solely a profit motive to 
sell the work of artists they exhibited and thus lost their exemptions for such reason.171  
On the other hand, if the incentives created by the private benefit also benefit the 
community – for example, to encourage participation or the expansion of resources in an 
underserved area – the very same incentives might be justified as necessary, and thus 
                                                      
168 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2)(ii). 
169 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,598 (1987). 
170 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862, 36 (1991) (determining that financial incentives for doctors to 
promote the competitive position of a hospital do not necessarily constitute a public benefit). 
171 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 71-395, 1971–2 C.B. 228 (revoking exemption of an organization that had a 
stated purpose of selling its members’ art); Rev. Rul. 76-152, 1976–1 C.B. 152 (revoking exemption of an 
organization that had a stated purpose to sell local artists’ art); P.L.R. 80–34–018 (1980) (revoking exemption 
of organization whose stated purpose was not to sell art, but whose sales activities grew to comprise 75% of 
its operations).  
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permissible private benefit.172 For example, the IRS has granted exempt status to galleries 
that promote art by providing such incentives for high schoolers, 173  economically 
disadvantaged artisans174 and artists with disabilities,175 and for artists in areas distant 
from other organizations that exhibit or sell art.176 Considering the audiences that art 
exhibitions at major art museums already draw, it is difficult to say that an incentive 
encouraging galleries’ display of artwork by artists they represent is necessary to get 
good art into museums.  In addition, there is already a concentration of art museums in 
the major markets in which gallery-supported museum exhibitions take place.  Thus, 
further private benefit, beyond the benefit inherent to exhibition, seems unnecessary in 
order to promote art, and there should be no exception for gallery-supported art 
exhibitions to the general rule that private benefit be incidental.177 
Private benefit must be both quantitatively and qualitatively incidental.  To be 
quantitatively incidental, the private benefit must be insubstantial, measured in the 
context of the overall exempt benefit conferred by the activity.178  Applying this part of 
the test, the Tax Court in several decisions scrutinized everything from an organization’s 
frequency of its art-related newsletters to the total number of hours engaged in 
educational activities compared against some measured financial benefit to artists.179  The 
IRS has likewise assessed quantitative incidental benefit with vigor.180  Most frequently, 
its comparisons evaluate the number and regularity of educational activities compared 
against the hours spent, or dollars earned, in the undertaking of sales activity.181  If the 
requirement that private benefit be quantitatively incidental was applied to a situation in 
which a gallery funded an art museum’s exhibition of art, the test would utilize similar 
                                                      
172 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862, supra note 170, at 76 (“We recognize that there may well be 
legitimate purposes for joint ventures, whether analyzed under the anti-kickback statute or the tax Code.  
These may include raising needed capital; bringing new services or a new provider to a hospital’s 
community; sharing the risk inherent in a new activity, or pooling diverse areas of expertise.”). 
173 Rev. Rul. 78-131, 1978–1 C.B. 157. 
174 Aid to Artisans v. Comm’r, 71 T.C. 202 (1978); P.L.R. 8849072 (Sept. 10, 1988). 
175 P.L.R. 9141053 (1991). 
176 Goldsboro Art League, Inc. v. Comm’r, 75 T.C. 337, 341-42 (1980); Cleveland Creative Arts 
Guild v. Comm’r, T.C.M. 1985–316; P.L.R. 8634001 (1986); P.L.R. 201441017 (July 18, 2014) (denying 
exemption to gallery located in an area with other galleries and organizations that exhibit art). 
177 For the purpose of this Article, the author does not challenge the fiction in which IRS and courts 
engage: that the labor to produce art is free.  This assumption is implicit in the IRS and Tax Court 
interpretations, which find that full compensation for artists work constitutes private benefit.  The average 
rate for reasonable compensation of artists is a 50% commission, though the power imbalance of artist-
gallerist relationship undermines the validity of this market-based profit allocation.  Therefore, it is actually 
impossible to provide art without necessarily benefitting the private interests of artists in doing so, and one 
would never suggest such an arrangement in other industries; for example, that doctors are not paid for 
medical services they deliver in the realm of health care. In any event, the IRS is hardly alone in making this 
problematic assumption, and therefore the scope of the issue and its associated implications are best left for 
other forums. 
178 E.g., Ginsburg v. Comm’r, 46 T.C. 47 (1966); Rev. Rul. 75-286, 1975-2 C.B. 210; Rev. Rul. 68-
14, 1968-1 C.B. 243. 
179 Aid to Artisans v. Comm’r, 71 T.C. 202 (1978); Goldsboro Art League, Inc. v. Comm’r, 75 T.C. 
337, 341-342 (1980); Cleveland Creative Arts Guild v. Comm’r, T.C.M. 1985–316 (1985).  
180 See, e.g., P.L.R. 88–49–072 (Sept. 10, 1988) and P.L.R. 86–34–001 (Aug. 13, 1986) (each 
approving exemption after lengthy analysis).  See also P.L.R. 80–34–018 (May 14, 1980); P.L.R. 2008–29–
046 (Apr. 17, 2008); P.L.R. 2011–25–044 (Mar. 30, 2011); and P.L.R. 2014–41–017 (Jul. 18, 2014) (each 
disapproving exemption after lengthy analysis). 
181 Id. 
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arithmetic.  Provided a nonprofit art organization engages in no direct art sales activity 
(that is, it does not sell art off its walls), the quantitative test would seem to easily result 
in a public benefit that outweighs private benefit to galleries or the artists they represent.  
Yet, Private Letter Ruling 9407006’s statement that the commercial and noncommercial 
spheres of the art market are not so easily distinguished casts doubt upon this outcome.182  
In stating that “[t]here is no requirement that an [art] exhibition be of a commercial 
nature or that a sale must accompany an exhibition for the exhibition to result in private 
benefit,” the ruling provides support for finding private benefit even in the absence of a 
specific sum of revenue directly obtained by the artist or gallery through a particular 
exhibition.  This result is consistent with the approach of the IRS and Tax Court to date, 
which relies only upon rough approximations of public and private benefit and does not 
utilize available models for measuring museum impact or artwork value.  As importantly, 
any other result is difficult to reconcile consistently with Private Letter Ruling 9407006’s 
determination that nonprofit art exhibitions at which no sales take place can confer 
private benefit.   
Private Letter Ruling 9407006’s unsettling expansion of quantifiable private 
benefit can be narrowed when considered together with the limitation that private benefit 
be qualitatively incidental.  To be qualitatively incidental, private benefit must be a 
necessary concomitant of the exempt activity, in that the exempt objectives cannot be 
achieved without necessarily benefiting certain individuals privately.183  Depending on 
how broadly or narrowly the phase “exempt objectives” is interpreted, the qualitative 
incidental requirement places some limit upon the otherwise boundless implications of 
Private Letter Ruling 9407006.  As the IRS recognized in that ruling, all exhibitions of 
art, commercial and noncommercial alike, benefit anyone with an interest in the exhibited 
art.  To state that a museum would be unable to achieve its purpose without engaging in 
private benefit and therefore the benefit of all exhibitions are incidental, however, 
eviscerates the limitation of its meaning.   
More carefully confined, however, the requirement that private benefit be 
qualitatively incidental is useful in separating gallery-supported art exhibitions that 
confer private benefit from exhibitions, gallery-supported or otherwise, that do not.  
Specifically, it compels the question of what art an organization must display in order for 
the public to benefit from its exhibition, and whether certain conditions under which the 
art is displayed vary the extent of private benefit.  Thus, the contributor-artist’s argument 
from Private Letter Ruling 9407006 has merit in the context of private benefit, as an 
exhibition likely confers less benefit for an artist who is already well-known than one 
who is unknown; likewise, some exhibitions confer greater benefit to galleries and artists 
than others,184 such as those that take place at major art museums.  A particular exhibition 
of art might also confer greater benefit if the artist’s work is currently or will soon be on 
                                                      
182 P.L.R. 94–08–006 (Dec. 4, 1992) (“There is no requirement that an [art] exhibition be of a 
commercial nature or that a sale must accompany an exhibition for the exhibition to result in private benefit. 
The nature of art is such that every exhibition increases the value of each piece on display and the value of all 
other works of that artist, including those pieces presently in existence and those that the artist will create in 
the future.”). 
183 See Rev. Rul. 70-186, 1970-1 C.B. 128. 
184  THORNTON, supra note 8, at 100. 
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the market,185 or if the price for the exhibited art is already higher to begin with than 
unexhibited art.186  However, these private benefits exist whether or not a gallery makes a 
donation to a nonprofit art organization.  On the other hand, a gallery-supported art 
exhibition might specifically confer greater private benefit to galleries when their 
donations preference the artists they represent for consideration in an art exhibition, and 
when the sponsorship rights granted to a gallery in exchange for making a donation 
facilitate galleries’ ability to sell art outside of the art exhibition.  Under such 
circumstances, it is likely that gallery-supported art exhibitions confer more than a 
quantitatively and qualitatively incidental private benefit to galleries and the artists they 
represent.   
3. A Special Case of Private Benefit: Joint Ventures 
The characteristics of the short-term relationship between a museum and gallery 
may be impermissible as a joint venture.187  While the law overall is clear that exempt 
organizations may partner with for-profits without affecting the former’s exempt status or 
tax liability, this rule is not absolute – especially when collaborations between for-profit 
and tax-exempt organizations present the potential for substantial benefits to for-profit 
participants.  Accordingly, joint ventures are a special case of private benefit, and the IRS 
has challenged many transactions in which a charity enters into a joint venture with 
private investors, even in circumstances where transactions did not involve insiders or 
siphoning off of the exempt organization’s assets.  While the majority of such decisions 
have taken place in the health care industry, 188 the IRS has taken issue with exempt arts 
organizations that work with for-profit partners to produce their programming.189  It is 
therefore conceivable that the IRS could challenge art exhibitions put on by museums 
with the assistance of galleries as joint ventures.   
In general, galleries’ financing of museum exhibitions does not take the form of 
joint venture entities or explicit joint venture agreements.  Substance matters more than 
form under federal tax law, however; therefore, when galleries fund art museum 
exhibitions, the IRS and courts may characterize their cooperation as a joint venture.  The 
classic joint venture recognized under federal tax law involves an exempt organization 
and a discrete legal entity, such as a partnership, limited liability company or other 
unincorporated association, through or by means of which any business, financial 
operation or venture is carried on.  The joint venture rules also apply to a wide variety of 
other legal forms, including potentially the types of agreements made between galleries 
and museums.  Joint ventures may exist between or among discrete legal entities, when 
they combine their resources to carry out a single business venture for joint profit, but do 
not create a formal incorporated or unincorporated association to do so.  For example, a 
tax-exempt organization and the for-profit entity might enter into an agreement to 
conduct an activity together, such as the exhibition of art.  In determining whether an 
                                                      
185 BARSTOW, supra note 44. This situation occurred in connection with the Sensation exhibition. 
Christie’s auction house explicitly said it wanted to make the most of its $50,000 donation to the exhibition, 
its largest ever such contribution to a museum.  
186 Even if the gain in value from exhibition is proportionate, 10% of $10 million ($1 million) is 
objectively larger than 10% of $100,000 ($10,000).  
187 Supra, Part II.A.1. 
188 See, e.g., I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862, supra note 170, at 39–47 (Nov. 22, 1991) (holding 
that “revenue stream” joint venture arrangements between doctors and a hospital for outpatient services 
violated the private benefit doctrine).  
189 Plumstead Theatre Soc., Inc. v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 1324 (1980). 
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arrangement constitutes a joint venture, some courts find the parties’ intention to be the 
most important factor.  Others disregard “nomenclature” and consider all facts and 
circumstances, emphasizing especially the elements of control and risk of loss.  
Therefore, even when tax-exempt and for-profit entities do not explicitly intend to create 
a joint venture, a court or the IRS may find that the parties’ relationship and behavior 
warrants characterization as a “law imposed joint venture” anyway.190  
Furthermore, federal tax law recognizes variation in the level of joint venture 
involvement.  Members in the joint ventures may actively participate in the joint venture 
through management, decision-making and execution, or they may be passive investors 
who supply funds and exercise limited agency but nonetheless profit from the joint 
venture’s activities.  In addition, the scope of the joint venture may encompass all or 
some of a tax-exempt entity’s activities.  At one extreme, the entirety of the exempt 
organization is in the venture; these joint ventures are called “whole entity” joint 
ventures.  In the middle, the primary operations of the exempt organization are in the 
venture.  In “ancillary joint ventures,” less than the primary operations of the exempt 
organization are in the venture.   
Depending on the degree of a museum’s collaboration with a gallery to produce 
an exhibition, the cooperation between a tax-exempt museum and a for-profit gallery to 
produce an exhibition could be subject to scrutiny as a law-imposed joint venture.  
Pursuant to the terms of the sponsorship agreement, galleries provide monetary or in-kind 
donations to fund the exhibition; the IRS has found that an art organization’s voluntary 
donations are provided in exchange for a benefit to artists.191   In addition, galleries 
exercise some (sometimes even ultimate) control over the exhibition.  In light of 
galleries’ fiduciary duties to the artists they represent, such activities are conducted in 
their best interest with a profit motive, not a public interest.192  Meanwhile, museums 
provide resources ranging from exhibition space, curatorial expertise and administrative 
coordination.  A gallery-supported museum exhibition thus could constitute a joint 
venture, and whether it is an ancillary joint venture or something more depends on 
whether its activities are substantial.   
A gallery-supported art exhibition remains an ancillary joint venture if it 
constitutes an insubstantial portion of the museum’s overall activities.  Even so, any 
ancillary joint venture activities that do not further an exempt purpose generate unrelated 
business income subject to the UBIT thereupon.193  Formal guidance issued by the IRS 
states that an exempt organization would not be subject to the UBIT if it retains control 
over the joint venture and its operations that constitute one or more related businesses.  
An exempt organization may retain control in ways other than by means of composition 
of a governing board of the joint venture, such as agreements that grant the exempt 
organization decision-making power.  Conversely, if such agreements grant control to the 
                                                      
190 P.L.R. 2006–22–055 (Mar. 7, 2006); P.L.R. 2012–35–021 (June 4, 2012); P.L.R. 2013–09–016 
(Dec. 5, 2012). 
191 P.L.R. 2012–10–043 (Dec. 13, 2011).  
192 See supra note 20. 
193 In ancillary joint ventures, the operational test is not at issue because the joint venture 
constitutes an insubstantial part of an exempt organization’s total operations (provided the exempt 
organization otherwise operates primarily for exempt purposes). 
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for-profit in the joint venture or are unrelated to an exempt purpose, its activities may be 
subject to the UBIT.194  
Gallery-supported museum exhibitions that comprise a substantial portion of a 
museum’s programmatic budget could even rise to the level of a joint venture that 
conducts the primary operations of the exempt museum.  Such joint venture’s activities 
may endanger the exempt organization’s exempt status entirely.  This risk derives from 
the conflict that arises when an exempt organization serves in a managing capacity as a 
general partner of the joint venture.  This is because the joint venture’s general partner 
has fiduciary duties to the other partners that conflict with an exempt organization’s 
obligation to pursue an exempt purpose exclusively.  Therefore, unless the principal 
purpose of the joint venture is to advance exempt purposes, an exempt organization that 
serves as general partner of a joint venture will lose or be denied exemption.  
Furthermore, the for-profit partners must not receive an undue economic return or other 
more than incidental private benefit, and the exempt organization must be insulated from 
the day-to-day management of the joint venture.  At the same time, however, the exempt 
organization cannot cede full control to a for-profit partner in a joint venture, either.  The 
IRS has suggested that a for-profit partner’s control of joint venture activities that 
constitute an exempt organization’s primary purpose raises private benefit issues.  In 
addition, even where the activities of the joint venture are related to the exempt purpose 
of the tax-exempt organization, control of such related activities by a for-profit convert 
the otherwise exempt activities into an unrelated business, and will lead to the loss of 
exempt status.195  
Whether a joint venture is ancillary or constitutes an exempt organization’s 
primary purpose, control is the crucial indicator in both cases that determines whether the 
joint venture’s activities advance an exempt purpose – even if such activities are 
inherently related to the exempt organization’s stated exempt purpose.  Accordingly, 
exhibition of art – one of the exempt purposes of art museums – effectively may not 
constitute an exempt purpose in a joint venture, if a for-profit such as a gallery or artist 
has control over such exhibition.  Therefore, gallery-supported museum exhibitions like 
©MURAKAMI, which granted final say to the artist and his gallery, would all but 
certainly mean that the exhibition furthered a nonexempt purpose.  Such finding would be 
consistent with the position of the IRS in Revenue Ruling 2004-51, 2004-1 C.B. 974, in 
which it found that ancillary joint ventures did not endanger the exempt organization’s 
status when the exempt organization maintained exclusive control over all major 
decisions, and at least equal control over all other, non-administrative issues. 196   In 
subsequent decisions considering such issue, the for-profit partners in other joint ventures 
have similarly not possessed control over the joint venture, and the exempt organization 
was able to maintain its status.197  Conversely, even when exempt organizations ceded 
only constructive,198 substantial199, majority200 or shared control201 the IRS denied their 
applications for exempt status.   
                                                      
194  Mary Hutchins Reed, Sponsorship and the Arts: A Brief Overview of Legal Issues for Not-For-
Profits, 13 ENT. SPORTS LAW 13 (1995); Gilbert, Corporate Sponsorship: The UBIT Analysis, C786 ALI-
ABA 21 (1992). 
195 HOPKINS, supra note 99. 
196 Rev. Rul. 2004-51, 2004-1 C.B. 974. 
197 P.L.R. 2005–28–029 (Apr. 20, 2005); P.L.R. 2014–19–015 (Feb. 14, 2014). 
198 P.L.R. 2008–51–033 (Sept. 25, 2008). 
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Such decisions strongly suggest that Revenue Ruling 2004-51’s standard – full 
control over major decisions and equal control over all other non-administrative decisions 
– is the minimum level of control that an exempt organization must possess over a joint 
venture’s activities in order for such activities to further an exempt purpose.  If a museum 
has anything less than full control over a gallery-supported museum exhibition, revenue 
from such exhibition may be taxable as unrelated business income or even cause the 
museum to lose its tax exemption if it constitutes a substantial portion of the museum’s 
activities.   
4. Commerciality and Unrelated Business Income Tax 
Beyond benefit to private interests (disinterested or otherwise), cooperation 
between for-profit galleries and nonprofit museums in producing exhibitions also poses 
the question of whether such activity is commercial in nature.  Outside of tax law, at least 
one court has determined that certain activities undertaken by museums in connection 
with art exhibitions, such as advertising a collection and publishing a guidebook for sale, 
constitute commercial activity.202  In addition, under federal tax law, nonprofit galleries’ 
ability to conduct art sales remains very restricted as nonexempt commercial activity.203  
However, the IRS and the courts have not explicitly extended this rule to noncommercial, 
but commercial gallery-supported, art exhibitions.  And while Private Letter Ruling 
9407006 significantly blurred the distinction between the commercial and 
noncommercial exhibition of art, it did not erase them entirely.  In stating that “[t]here is 
no requirement that an [art] exhibition be of a commercial nature or that a sale must 
accompany an exhibition for the exhibition to result in private benefit,” it implicitly 
acknowledged that some—but not all—art exhibitions are commercial.  Therefore, even 
though a nonprofit art organization may not directly engage in art sales at a gallery-
supported art exhibition, the commercial nature of such exhibition remains an important 
determination relevant to exempt status, especially in light of the role that for-profit 
gallery sponsors play. 
Generally, an exempt organization may engage in profit-seeking activities in 
furtherance of its exempt purpose, as long as the organization’s mission itself is not 
commercial, and its primary objective is not the production of profits.  Under the 
commerciality doctrine, however, an organization that conducts substantial activities in a 
commercial manner may be found to be engaged in nonexempt activity that risks its 
exempt status entirely.  Furthermore, although commercial activity will not endanger 
exemption if it is insubstantial, it may still be subject to the UBIT.  A clear, definitive test 
                                                                                                                                                   
199 P.L.R. 2013–14–047 (Jan. 10, 2013) (denying exemption to an organization where one of its 
four directors owned a for-profit and such director made significant decisions about the operations of the 
organization).  
200 P.L.R. 2014–36–050 (June 12, 2014). 
201 P.L.R. 2010–07–072 (Sept. 24, 2009).  
202 Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1205 (C.D. Cal. 2011). 
203 See supra notes 162–67.  But see Aid to Artisans, Inc. v. Comm’r, 71 T.C. 202 (T.C. 1978) 
(finding that an organization that engaged in activities similar to those of a commercial import firm – the 
purchase, import, and sale of handicrafts – was nonetheless operated exclusively for exempt purposes 
because those activities were carried out exclusively to accomplish the exempt purpose of helping 
disadvantaged artisans); P.L.R. 9141053 (Jul. 19, 1991) (finding that the sale of consigned art by disabled 
artists as well as the sale of donated art by nondisabled artists is in furtherance of an exempt purpose and not 
subject to UBIT, where all proceeds supported operations); P.L.R. 8634001 (Aug. 13, 1986) (finding rental 
and sale of art in furtherance of an exempt purpose and not subject to UBIT). 
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for determining the commercial nature of an activity has not developed under the 
commerciality doctrine.204  An activity may be commercial in nature if it is conducted in 
the same manner as is the case in the realm of for-profit organizations.205  Competition, 
profitability, and an otherwise “commercial hue” are all evidence that an activities’ 
manner of conduct are too for-profit like.   
With respect to profitability, gallery donations primarily cover exhibition costs, 
and a straightforward summation of a museum’s ticket sales revenue from a gallery-
supported art exhibition would likely show minimal net earned income, if any. 206  
However, considering the gain that galleries expect to obtain for their artists in exchange 
for their donations, it seems that gallery donations are payment for a services and 
therefore would be most appropriately categorized as earned income, like ticket sales.  
This classification of gallery contributions as profit seems especially appropriate when an 
art organization professes that it would still be conducting the same exhibition in the 
absence of gallery donations; if the organization conducts the same activities and brings 
in the same revenue only at a lower cost due to galleries’ donations, the difference results 
in a greater profit. 207   This fact significantly distinguishes gallery-supported art 
exhibitions from other exhibitions at nonprofit art organizations, such that the former 
results in greater profitability than the latter.   
Commercial hue is the extent to which a nonprofit organization’s activities are 
largely animated by a commercial purpose and directed fundamentally to ends other than 
exempt purposes.208  A definite meaning of commercial hue is missing from the tax 
framework, inviting subjective assessment of art exhibitions and whether their quality 
renders them commercial.209  In addition, application of the commercial hue factor to art 
is further complicated by the dual nature of art as both a commodity and something more 
than a market good, such that art is simultaneously both commercial and anti-commercial 
in character.210  While these conceptual challenges are valid in broad strokes, it may 
nonetheless be possible to discern meaningful marginal variation in the commercial hue 
of gallery-supported art exhibitions when compared against non-gallery-supported art 
                                                      
204 Indeed, the commerciality doctrine suffers same definitional problems as private benefit, and 
has a potentially limitless application as the bounds of what is commercial and noncommercial blur in today’s 
economy of social enterprise, triple bottom lines, and the creative industry. 
205 Living Faith, Inc. v. Comm’r, 950 F.2d 371 (1991) (finding that competition with commercial 
firms is a strong suggestion that a substantial nonexempt purpose exists; evidence of such competition may 
include setting market (rather than below-cost) prices, locating near similar for-profit enterprises, investing in 
promotional advertising, and reaping profits).  
206 Mike Boehm, Report shows art museums rely mainly on kindness, not commerce, L.A. TIMES, 
Jan. 9, 2015, http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/arts/culture/la-et-cm-art-museums-financial-survey-
getty-lacma-eli-broad-hammer-aamd-20150108-story.html (reporting that art museums’ earned income from 
ticket sales and concessions cover only 15% of average art museum expenses) [perma.cc/VW66-AT7M]. 
207 John D. Colombo, In Search of Private Benefit, 58 FLA. L. REV. 1063, 1087 (2006) (arguing that 
the private benefit doctrine does not apply to a tax-exempt organization’s day-to-day services but may apply 
to its “core services” central to its mission). See also Brian Frye, Arts Funding & “Private Benefit,” 
NONPROFIT LAW PROF BLOG (2016), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/nonprofit/2016/05/arts-funding-
private-benefit.html. 
208 Better Business Bureau of Washington, D.C., Inc. v. United States, 279 U.S. 279, 326 (1945). 
209 Jessica Pena & Alexander L.T. Reid, A Call for Reform of the Operational Test for Unrelated 
Commercial Activity in Charities, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1855, 1877 (Dec. 2001). 
210 An exception is nearly unsellable work, like the land art of Christo and Jeanne-Claude or Robert 
Smithson; however, even unsellable art may be sold in the form of derivative works, such as the artist’s study 
sketches or photographs of the work. 
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exhibitions.  Reports of gallery-supported art exhibitions locate them at large, 
corporatized art organizations.  While commercial hue does not mean that art 
organizations must not professionally operate or provide their goods and services free of 
charge, 211  such institutions are often the same institutions with greatest power to 
legitimize–and therefore increase the commercial value of–art.212  Gallery-supported art 
exhibitions are not taking place at smaller, unknown nonprofit art organizations, even 
though these institutions seem as if they would be most in need of sponsorship in light of 
their commensurately smaller budgets and collections.  This distribution of gallery-
supported art exhibitions seems indicative of their commercial hue, with the function of 
such nonprofit art organizations and galleries thus converging as commercial.   
The final factor indicative of commerciality considers the existence of 
competition among for-profit counterparts to the exempt organization’s activity.  An 
activity is commercial in nature if it has a direct counterpart in for-profit organizations.  
Evidence of competition with such counterparts may include setting market (rather than 
below-cost) prices, locating near similar for-profit enterprises, investing in promotional 
advertising, or otherwise conducting operations in a manner similar to that of analogous 
commercial entities.  Reaping profits is also evidence of competitive commercial 
operations.213  
Art exhibitions’ below market prices to view art (for the price of only an 
admission ticket) generally undermines a finding of competitiveness that is indicative of 
commerciality.  Whether they are collecting or non-collecting institutions, museums and 
other nonprofit art organizations are contextualizing institutions in theory that are a part 
of the discourse setting infrastructure of the art industry.  The value they deliver to the 
public is the opportunity to see artworks in context, an activity that would be 
prohibitively expensive for most people if only for the curating and art shipping costs, let 
alone the cost of, and access to, the artworks themselves.  Indeed, in the commercial 
market, generally there may be no way to view an artwork after it is sold into a 
collection, in light of the strong norm disfavoring resale and the lack of public 
information about the location and owners of artworks.  In effect, but for nonprofit art 
organizations’ efforts in curating and coordinating exhibitions, art would be largely 
inaccessible and unaffordable to the public.  A museum admission ticket enables viewing 
of many artworks for a fraction of what it would cost to own artworks as a private 
collector.   
The for-profit private collector counterpart analogy breaks down, however, if the 
artworks are for sale.214  Even when nonprofit art organizations are not directly selling a 
work, simply hosting an exhibition can lead to sales.  Every artwork loan is potentially a 
sale and can lead to establishing a consignment relationship with the lending collector.  
Also, exhibitions help galleries cultivate relationships with artists or estates that galleries 
                                                      
211 Plumstead Theatre Soc., Inc. v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 1324 (1980), aff'd 675 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 
1982). 
212 GRAW, supra note 2, at 92 (stating that the greater the success in “preserving art’s reputation as . 
. . more than objects of speculation – which they really are—the greater the positive impact on [the] business” 
of selling art”). 
213 Living Faith, Inc., 950 F.2d at 373; B.S.W. Group, Inc. v. Comm’r, 70 T.C. 352, 359 (1978). 
214 Museums are generally prevented from selling their collections on account of strict 
deaccessioning policies and norms.  However, artworks that are loaned to a museum by a gallery or a 
collector are not bound by such museum policies. 
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hope to ultimately represent.215  While this is the case in any exhibition facilitated, even if 
not financially supported, by a gallery, it is even truer when the gallery sponsoring the 
exhibition has negotiated for advertising credits and other sponsorship rights that help 
them make sales.  In this sense, gallery-supported art exhibitions that take place at art 
museums are the functional equivalents of temporary, for-profit pop-up galleries, with the 
gallery’s donation to the art museum best understood as rent for the period of the pop-up 
rather than a gratuitous gift.  In this case, the applicable counterpart to a nonprofit art 
organization is not a private collector but rather a gallery,216 which exhibits works at no 
cost to the viewing public to solicit sales.  As an increasing number of galleries are 
hosting “museum quality gallery shows,” this alternative analogy becomes even more 
appropriate.   
The remaining factors used in evaluating the presence of competition, and thus 
commerciality, weigh against the exempt status of nonprofit art organizations.  Nonprofit 
art organizations undertake significant advertising of gallery-supported museum 
exhibitions–typically paid for by the gallery itself as a condition of its sponsorship.  
Many of the museums hosting gallery-supported art exhibitions are also located near for-
profit galleries; even if the exhibitions travel, they often go to museums in cities with 
significant numbers of commercial galleries and not remote locations lacking in the 
availability of commercially or non-commercially exhibited artwork.  For example, the 
©MURAKAMI exhibition traveled from MOCA to the Brooklyn Museum of Art in New 
York; the Museum für Moderne Kunst in Frankfurt; and lastly the Guggenheim Museum 
Bilbao, Spain.  Each such city is a significant art center with some of the highest 
concentrations of galleries in their respective markets.   
All three aspects that assess competition plausibly support that nonprofit art 
organizations hosting gallery-supported art exhibitions do so in a commercial manner that 
competes with other for-profit galleries–specifically, other for-profit galleries that do not 
have the benefit of the hosting tax-exempt exhibitions.  In addition, the factors evaluating 
a gallery-supported art exhibition’s profitability and commercial hue are also indicative 
of commerciality.  While no precedent directly supports a definitive finding that for-
profit gallery sponsorship of nonprofit art museum exhibitions is commercial, it is not a 
question that the IRS or courts have precisely considered to date.  In a relevant decision, 
however, the IRS has concluded that sales and exhibition activity conducted by a 
volunteer committee of a nonprofit art museum is unrelated to an art museum’s exempt 
purpose.217   
                                                      
215 SHEETS, supra note 73. 
216 That private collections are ultimately donated to the collections of existing public museums or 
to the collections of newly established private operating foundation museums is of no consequence to the 
analogy.  
217 In Private Letter Ruling 80–40–014, the IRS considered whether insubstantial art sales and 
rental activities conducted at a nonprofit art museum jeopardized the museum’s exempt status.  The Women’s 
Committee of the museum operated a gallery, which presented four shows each year, generating gross 
income constituting less than four percent of the museum’s gross income for the year in question.  All such 
income from the operation of the gallery was used exclusively for the benefit of the museum.  The IRS found 
that the gallery’s activities served the private interest of artists, rejecting the museum’s contention that the 
gallery’s operation substantially related to the museum’s exempt purpose.  Because the gallery’s activities 
were insubstantial in comparison to the museum’s primary activities, however, the IRS concluded the 
museum was still operated exclusively for exempt purposes. P.L.R. 80–40–014 (July 9, 1980). 
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Even if gallery-supported art exhibitions are commercial, they may not 
necessarily undermine exempt status entirely, provided that they are insubstantial in 
nature.  Instead, insubstantial commercial activities are subject to the UBIT as previously 
discussed.  One IRS decision suggested that insubstantial gallery sales and rental 
activities conducted at a nonprofit art museum did not jeopardize the museum’s exempt 
status, but potentially could be subject to the UBIT as a separate revenue stream under 
the fragmentation rule.218 Alternatively, it is conceivable that gallery donations provided 
to a museum in support of an exhibition of its artists might be considered unrelated 
business income as a “substantial return benefit,” if a gallery’s sponsorship was not 
considered to be a “qualified sponsorship payment,” which does not generate unrelated 
business income.219 “Qualified sponsorship payments” are excluded from the unrelated 
business income of exempt organizations when there is no arrangement or expectation 
that the payor of the sponsorship will receive a “substantial return benefit” for the 
payment, other than the use or acknowledgement of the name or logo (or product lines) of 
the payor’s trade or business in connection with the tax-exempt organization’s 
activities.220 The benefits enumerated by the IRS in its interpretive guidance that might 
constitute a “substantial return benefit” are comprehensive in scope: among others, 
advertising, intellectual property rights, goods, services and “other privileges.”221 While 
the IRS has applied these rules to art museums and other arts organizations in illustrative 
examples included in its binding interpretive guidance,222 these enumerated benefits have 
not been interpreted to capture the significant benefits that galleries receive from an 
exhibition it sponsors at an art museum.  
Specifically, the IRS has overlooked benefits to galleries from exhibitions they 
sponsor at museums including: the space in which the exhibition takes place; the costs of 
installing the exhibition; the curatorial services of the staff in arranging the exhibition; 
the connections to potential purchasers of an artist’s works that would otherwise be 
facilitated by art consultants in private art transactions; and the most valuable benefit of 
all, the appreciation in value of an artist’s works, both those shown in the exhibition or 
others in the artist’s oeuvre. Especially when gallery-sponsored exhibitions take place at 
major art museums, such appreciation can be significant, resulting from an artwork’s 
more varied provenance as a result of appearing in the show, and the increased esteem of 
the artist due to his or her appearance of the exhibition and its inclusion an additional line 
on the artists’ curriculum vitae. Establishing the exhibition as the cause of such 
appreciation could be accomplished by using the expertise of art valuation experts before 
and after an exhibition. To date, however, this appreciation has not been measured or 
otherwise considered to constitute an “other privilege” to the sponsoring gallery under the 
                                                      
218 Id. 
219 I.R.C. § 513(i)(1). A “substantial return payment” is any benefit other than (a) goods, services or 
other benefits of insubstantial benefits that are disregarded under Treas. Reg. § 1.1513–4(c)(2)(ii) or (b) a use 
or acknowledgement described in Treas. Reg. § 1.1513–4(c)(2)(iv). Treas. Reg. § 1.513–4(c)(2)(i). 
220 I.R.C. § 513(i)(2)(A). 
221 Benefits may include advertising, an exclusive provider arrangement, certain goods, facilities, 
services or other privileges, and an exclusive or nonexclusive right to use an intangible asset (e.g., trademark, 
patent, logo, or designation) of the exempt organization. Treas. Reg. § 1.1513-4(c)(2)(iii). 
222 Treas. Reg. 1.513-4(c)(2)(iii), Illustration N (describing how a dinner provided to sponsors of an 
art exhibition would be considered a substantial return benefit); Treas. Reg. § 1.1513-4(f), Illustration T 
(describing how a symphony orchestra’s promotion of a sponsor’s business in the symphony’s program guide 
and complimentary tickets to a symphony show are substantial benefits). 
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“substantial return benefit” rules. Because appreciation, if any, benefitting a sponsoring 
gallery is not considered to be a “substantial return benefit,” the result is that the amount 
of the gallery donation that is taxable to the art museum as unrelated business income is 
reduced or entirely eliminated.  
In any case, whether gallery-supported art exhibitions generate unrelated 
business income or not is unlikely to have a significant deterrence effect upon their 
continuation.  Even if profit were defined expansively to include not only gallery 
donations but also admission ticket revenues and even grants received because of 
successful attendance numbers at gallery-supported exhibitions, there likely would be 
little or no “profit” subject to the UBIT.  Museums could deduct all business expenses 
and proportionate overhead directly attributable to the gallery-supported exhibition, 
leaving little revenue to tax.  A review of recent museum unrelated business tax reporting 
on Form 990-T confirms this outcome, 223  and there is little reason to think that 
characterizing gallery donations as additional unrelated business income would change 
the current practice. 
B. Lack of Self-Discipline 
The art industry demonstrates a near total lack of industry self-discipline with 
respect to the permissibility of gallery-supported museum exhibitions.  Among the 
publicly available written guidelines reviewed, no self-regulatory museum association 
and, with rare exception, no individual museum specifically prohibits donations made by 
galleries, as a general matter or specifically with respect to underwriting the direct costs 
of an exhibition.  Gallery-supported art exhibitions are thus largely permissible under 
individual museum and other industry association guidelines.  Even if museums or the art 
industry adopted such guidelines, the absence of meaningful enforcement mechanisms 
fail to provide confidence that museums would observe them.  For example, following 
the AAMD’s 2014 sanction of the Delaware Art Museum for its deaccession of several 
artworks, the Delaware Art Museum nonetheless collaborated with an AAMD-member – 
the director of the Smithsonian American Art Museum no less. 224   Even if AAMD 
members honor sanctions, they may not be sufficiently severe to deter violations, such as 
in the case of the two-year sanction for the National Academy Museum.225  
C. Cooperation is Currently the Only Option 
The art industry demonstrates self-awareness of the potential for conflict that 
gallery-supported museum exhibitions present.  For example, the Whitney Museum of 
American Art did not allow Robert Morris to arbitrage art with the museum’s funds and 
his insider knowledge–even for the museum’s benefit and not his own–as proposed for 
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his piece Money (1969).226  Just two years later, however, the art world demonstrated that 
the “market casts a long shadow reaching into the economy-free zone of the public 
museum” with Hans Haacke’s Shapolsky et al.  Manhattan Real Estate Holdings, A Real 
Time Social System, as of May 1, 1971 (1971).227  The artwork was 142 photographs of 
the properties owned by a well-known New York slumlord, and was to be presented at 
the Guggenheim until its exhibition was cancelled in light of the show’s political and 
economic overtones.  More recently, the subject of several artworks has critically 
addressed hybrid, conflicting roles within the art industry.  Andrea Fraser’s performance 
art pieces Official Welcome (2001) and Untitled (2003) have juxtaposed the characters of 
critic, artist, curator, and collector, and Bill Powhida’s aforementioned work How the 
New Museum Committed Suicide with Banality (2009) directly addressed one museum-
related dealer’s relationship to New Museum-exhibited artists.   
However, norms have not yet evolved to set limits on gallery-supported art 
exhibitions.  This persistence is at least partially attributable to the art industry norms 
discussed in Part III that do not frown upon, and even encourage, cooperation of the sort 
that would be considered questionable in other contexts.  In addition, no other option 
exists in the art market’s current configuration but close cooperation.  Museums have 
always had to work with galleries to present complete exhibitions that entailed borrowing 
works from private collector’s collections. Art transactions are not public knowledge, and 
therefore museums must rely upon galleries in order to identify collectors and coordinate 
artwork loans.  Closer cooperation has occurred as nonprofit art organizations have 
turned to galleries for financial support as well, in light of the declines in government 
grants, private donations from individuals, and corporate sponsors.  Not presenting high 
profile exhibitions that require significant artwork loans and financial resources has not 
seemed to be a viable option either, as these productions maintain the cultural legitimacy 
that give museums the power to execute their function in the first place.   
Existing legal standards have not yet been applied to current market practices to 
directly confront for-profit galleries’ funding of exhibitions presented by nonprofit art 
museums.  Industry self-regulation also has not evolved to address gallery-supported art 
exhibitions.  The result further exacerbates an already limited number of genuinely 
noncommercial art exhibition spaces that can show art free from market pressures.228 
Accordingly, any attempt to restrict gallery-supported art exhibitions must address the 
ultimate causes of the practice itself as well as industry norms.  Regulation that is 
insensitive to context is likely to be ill-suited and distorting in the best case and ignored 
and ineffective in the worst case.   
 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
Analysis of the laws, self-regulatory guidance, and industry norms reveals that 
there are a number of possible responses to address the problem of gallery-supported 
museum exhibitions.   
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A. Structural Changes to the Institutional and Regulatory Framework 
At one end of the spectrum is structural overhaul of the existing regime to 
address the causes that lead museums to seek galleries’ financial support.  At its most 
extreme, such response might entail direct public funding for the arts—a highly 
improbable proposal in light of a recent proposal to eliminate the National Endowment 
for the Arts. 229 Alternatively, structural change within the facilitation model for 
supporting the arts that the United States currently uses might look like relaxation of rules 
that would permit greater indirect funding to artists.  For example, the IRS could reverse 
its current position that nonprofit galleries’ compensation of artists for their artworks do 
not constitute private benefit but rather reasonable compensation.  This reversal would be 
consistent with the position of the IRS that other contexts, such as nonprofit health care 
or higher education, do not require service providers (in each example, physicians and 
professors) to work for free.  The narrowest structural response would target the art 
industry with special rules within tax law–for example, establishing better, objective 
standards for the IRS to evaluate the process by which nonprofit art organizations select 
programming.  Unless such standards were carefully crafted to focus solely on curatorial 
methods, one drawback of this approach might be that it all but compels the IRS to judge 
the merits of artwork, which has proven problematic in other areas of law, such as 
copyright. 230  This response also might create further doctrinal chaos in the already 
muddled areas of private benefit and commerciality, so modifying or augmenting the law 
in this way may be undesirable.   
Effective structural reform addressing gallery-sponsored art exhibitions should 
also comprehensively contemplate the panoply of problematic practices–in the art world 
and beyond–that raise the same or similar issues in order to foster a cohesive regulatory 
scheme.  These practices include sponsorship of museum programming by artists or 
private collectors of artworks, such as when Kakai Kiki, the artist collective-slash-gallery 
started by Murakami, sponsored an exhibit of one of its own artists,231 or when the private 
collectors who owned Alexander Calder’s famous Flying Fish mobile sponsored its 
exhibition only a few years before its record-shattering auction at Christie’s for nearly 
$26 million.232  Examination of the role of for-profit sponsorship at nonprofits may even 
extend to programming outside of art museums, like a hypothetical “Finding Nemo Day” 
sponsored by Disney at a nonprofit public aquarium or paid product placement in 
television programs and movies.  Similar to the fact-driven approach taken in this Article, 
each of these context demands careful scrutiny before blanket curtailment.  As Professor 
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Zahr Said points out in her article, Embedded Advertising and the Venture Consumer, this 
is because sponsorship can have positive effects in certain circumstances, such as when 
consumers are educated, empowered, and discerning; when product placement improves 
allocation of costs and risks; and when the additional cash flow provided by “embedded 
advertising” improves programming quality.233 These circumstances ultimately do not 
translate, however, to the realm of gallery-sponsored art exhibitions at museums; at the 
very least, programming quality is highly subjective and promoting art is an educational 
activity, and therefore the target “consumer” museum patron is by definition uneducated.  
However needed structural reform addressing gallery-sponsored art exhibitions at 
museums may be, any structural change requires proactive policy introductions that are 
unlikely to take place in the current stalemate political climate. 
B. Eliminating and Expanding Gallery-Supported Art Exhibitions 
Within the existing framework, the challenges most likely to be successful in 
curbing certain gallery-supported art exhibitions are that they constitute a joint venture in 
which galleries possess too great of control, therefore obtaining impermissible private 
benefit; that the preferential consideration for exhibitions, the sponsorship rights they 
grant to galleries, or both are also impermissible private benefit; or that the gallery-
supported art exhibitions are substantial commercial activities that do not further an 
exempt purpose.  The effect of these determinations would likely put an end to museum 
demand for galleries’ generosity, as it is unlikely that a museum would throw away its 
valuable exempt status in exchange for any gallery’s financial support.   
Eliminating gallery-supported art exhibitions at some nonprofit art organizations 
would not necessarily eliminate such exhibitions entirely.  Similar forms of such 
exhibitions might continue to take place at galleries, while the profile of some nonprofit 
art organizations would diverge therefrom–making space for truly non-and anti-
commercial exhibitions of art to take place.  For the cities that do not have galleries that 
host museum-quality gallery shows or the smaller-scale museums that do not currently 
attract gallery-sponsored art exhibitions, there still may be a case for galleries to work 
with museums to present these shows.  In fact, perhaps somewhat counterintuitively, the 
charitable purpose of promoting art may be better served by encouraging more gallery-
sponsored exhibitions to take place in such locations.  Doing so could channel more 
funding for higher quality exhibitions to venues that currently suffer from lower quality 
programming from lack of financial support.  Another possible outcome is that curbing 
gallery-sponsored art exhibitions in certain circumstances might drive demand for 
alternative art spaces.  To the extent such spaces don’t exist yet, they may crop up to the 
delight of cities that are currently vying to establish and attract art venues.  For example, 
dealers interested in displaying their artists’ work but that are unable to do so at a 
museum might invest in infrastructure to do so.  These outcomes are consistent with the 
incentives of federal tax law that seek to promote art through wide dissemination to 
markets that are otherwise without access. 
While ending gallery-supported exhibitions at nonprofit art organizations would 
represent short-term progress toward the conscious boundary setting for which Professor 
Isabelle Graw advocates, this solution ultimately does nothing to address the trifold 
structural causes ultimately driving the need for a boundary.  Museums’ lack of funding 
compels them to seek donations from galleries in the first place.  Secondly, museums lack 
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independent access to the critical information exclusively possessed by galleries about 
culturally important artworks.  Even the most extensive permanent museum collections 
do not contain all the necessary artworks to present a complete thematic exhibition, and 
therefore museums are unable to produce complete exhibitions without borrowing works 
from collectors.  Galleries fiercely protect this private and proprietary information about 
their clients, so it is not public information that museums can obtain without a dealer’s 
assistance.  Third, the incredibly high prices and market imperialism as of late across all 
art world institutions compel museums to engage with the market in order to maintain 
their industry relevance.  Museums need to resolve their identity crisis and establish their 
place in relation to the art market in order to curtail their dependence upon it.   
C. Increased Disclosure about Gallery-Sponsored Art Exhibitions 
Currently Form 990 annual informational returns filed by museums do not 
disclose the identities of donors.  Also, there does not seem to be self-regulatory 
organization guidance requiring that museums post disclosures about the sponsors of 
exhibits.  Increased disclosure could put museum patrons on notice that the artworks they 
are viewing may be on display for reasons including those unrelated to their merit.  
Nonetheless, such disclosures are unlikely to be effective in addressing the issues raised 
by gallery-supported art exhibitions.  The issue is not so much disclosure as it is the very 
fact that sponsored exhibitions are occurring and potentially crowding out others of equal 
or greater merit but with fewer financial resources to pay-to-play.  Therefore, more 
disclosure is not a responsive reform.   
Even if disclosure was nonetheless part of a solution for addressing gallery-
sponsored museum exhibitions, its efficacy depends upon its location and audience.  The 
Form 990 informational return is not an effective place to disclose sponsorship; museum 
patrons are unlikely to dig up nonprofit art museums’ tax returns to identify sponsored 
exhibits a year after they visit a museum when the museum’s tax returns are filed and 
become public.  Disclosures juxtaposed with artworks at a gallery-sponsored art 
exhibition may present yet other limitations.  Absent is a “shareholder” base to scrutinize 
informational returns in the same way that securities disclosures are analyzed by public 
capital markets, and enforcement of nonprofit laws is lax in light of primary 
responsibility falling upon state attorney generals and an underfunded federal agency.  
Further disclosure drawbacks may be the same as those identified in Professor Zahr 
Said’s Embedded Advertising and the Venture Consumer, including burdening the 
museum patron’s “immersion interest” and whether or not the consumer even cares.234  
(However, beyond the ways in which embedded advertising in television and movies was 
distinguished from gallery-supported art exhibitions in the foregoing section, what is at 
stake in museums–cultural production and preservation–may be greater than television 
and movies.  Among other distinctions, even if the artistic endeavors embodied in 
television and movies also contribute to culture, television and movies may not share the 
same cultural function as museums beyond their entertainment function.)  
Counterintuitively, mandating disclosure might even increase the benefit to 
sponsors as free advertising, at the same time that it decreases crayola donations to 
museums, who often use billing credit as a negotiation chip to increase gift size.  There is 
research demonstrating that sponsors already desire credit for their “altruism” and treat 
donations as advertising (for example, Professor Vikramaditya Khanna’s research 
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suggests that corporate social responsibility expenditure mandates may decrease 
advertising spending).235 
*     *     * 
The art industry ultimately must reckon with the structural causes of gallery-
supported art exhibitions in order to sustain the existence and integrity of art museums in 
the long-term.  Appropriate redress will necessarily be as complex as the cause, and there 
are no easy solutions.  Direct public funding for the arts is likely to take a back seat to 
other budget priorities in light of fiscal conservativism, a privatization imperative, and 
other reasons.  Promoting market transparency and efficient pricing for a more well-
functioning art market are goals that already have significant support and therefore may 
resonate more broadly.  However, the devil is in the details with respect to developing 
and implementing an appropriate art market regulatory apparatus.  The effort required to 
do so would be worthwhile in light of the importance of museums, and art and culture 
more broadly, to our society.  Our society as a whole should care about museums, 
because they are where we express, understand, and negotiate our cultural identities and 
relevance to one another.  We want institutions responsible for something as important as 
cultural preservation to be inclusive and protected from self-serving elitism that 
perpetuates cultural dominance. 
Finally, addressing these structural issues provides an opportunity to reflect upon 
what it means to promote art responsibly, especially in an age of burgeoning cultural 
production, shrinking art organization budgets and programming, and increasingly 
inequitable access to art.  How can we restructure the provision of resources and power to 
museums in light of financial stress upon art organizations more broadly, as well as 
wealth and social inequality in general? This is part of a broader conversation about 
access to publicly funded resources, and how to negotiate growing demands upon them 
from an increasingly diverse general public with varying needs, at the same time that 
such resources become more limited.  What is public? What is private? What level of 
habitability do we want of our public cultural life, and how low can diversity in the arts 
go before promotion of arts instead becomes the reproduction of power and privilege?236  
In light of the importance of art to culture and community cohesion, we want to answer 
this question proactively, and not let the market decide for us. 
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